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Abstract 
People differ, often strikingly, in their views on desired social structures and processes. 
For example, while some value ethnic diversity in their society, others believe non -indigenous 
individuals (whatever that might mean) should be repatriated to their land of origin. Similarly, 
whereas some believe religion should play no role in determining social policy, others strongly 
advocate the importance of living according to religious scripture, including at a social level. 
This variation in attitudes, and its implication for societal cohesion, has made research on the 
origins of social and political attitudes of enduring interest to psychologists, sociologists, 
political scientists, among many others. 
The goal of the current thesis was to extend work in this literature in two key ways: 
Firstly, I examined whether political attitudes can be understood within a personality system 
model. This work addresses previous mixed results on the links of basic personality traits to 
political conservatism. In Chapter 3, I test predictions from this model; namely, that direct 
influences on political behaviour flow from moral values, with personality mostly acting 
indirectly via these moral values, rather than directly affecting political attitudes. Findings from 
two studies (published as Lewis & Bates, 2011a) supported these predictions suggesting that the 
new model helps explain inconsistencies in previous research attempting to link personality to 
political orientation that have not included the intermediary level of values. 
Secondly, I examined the genetic architecture of social attitudes constructs in three 
separate studies. Chapter 4 addressed whether in -group favouritism reflects heritable effects, and, 
secondly, whether race -favouritism was accounted for broad or specific genetic effects. Results 
indicated that a common biological mechanism exists facilitating generalised favouritism, with 
evidence for additional genetic effects specific to each form of group favouritism. These findings 
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(published as Lewis & Bates, 2010) suggest that (at least) at the genetic level, race favouritism is 
multiply determined. 
In Chapter 5, I examined whether prosocial obligations across the domains of welfare, 
work, and civic obligation share a common genetic basis, or reflect specific heritable 
components (published as Lewis & Bates, 2011b). In females, results indicated the existence of a 
common heritable factor underlying each of these prosocial obligations. In males, a prosocial 
factor was also observed; familial effects (genetic and shared -environment effects were 
indistinguishable) influenced this general mechanism. At the domain -specific level, modest 
genetic effects were observed in females for civic and work obligations, with shared - 
environment effects influencing welfare obligations. In males, genetic influences were observed 
for welfare obligation, with unique -environments affecting work and civic duty. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I present work examining the genetic architecture of religious 
belief. Although genetic factors are known to influence strength of religious belief, the 
psychological mechanism(s) through which this biological influence is manifest are presently 
unknown. Two non -theological constructs - 1) need for community integration and 2) need for 
existential certainty - were hypothesised to account for the genetic effects on religiosity. The 
results supported this hypothesis, with genetic influences on these traits wholly accounting for 
the heritable basis of religiosity, suggesting that religion "re- uses" systems involved in meeting 
both social and existential needs. 
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A Note on Personal Pronouns 
This thesis is based on published work to a large extent. In order to maintain consistency 
with the published literature, and to acknowledge the collaborative nature of the work, "we" 
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Chapter One - Individual Differences in Social and Political Attitudes: An Overview 
I often think it's comical; Nature always does contrive! 
That every boy and every gal that's born into the world alive 
Is either a little Liberal, Or else a little Conservative! Fal, lal, la! 
W.S. Gilbert and A. Sullivan 
1.1 Homo Politicus: An Introduction 
Considerable individual differences exist in social and political attitudes. For example, 
data from the US General Social Survey 2010 indicates that around 25% of Americans would 
prefer homosexual books removed from public libraries, and around 20% want gays to be 
banned from teaching in schools (Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 2011). In the same survey 
almost 60% felt unrestricted access to abortion treatments was wrong (with, interestingly, little 
difference by gender), and more than 50% believed that anti -American Muslim clergymen 
should not be allowed to speak in public. 
In Europe, similar variability in socio- political attitudes is apparent. For example, while 
religious belief is less prevalent (as compared to the US), a recent survey still suggests that 
around a third of Britons feel that religious leaders should play a more prominent role in social 
issues (YouGov, 2010). 24% feel that academic freedom should not extend to potentially 
offensive or racist conclusions (vs. 44% who felt academics should be free irrespective of their 
conclusions: 32% entered `neither' or `not sure'; YouGov, 2011a), and 49% oppose gay 
marriage (vs. 42% who are in support: 9% entered `don't know'; YouGov, 2011b). 
With this variability in mind, and the implications of such differences in opinion for 
societal cohesion, the goal of this thesis is to further current understandings of the origins of 
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social and political attitudes, with a particular focus on political conservatism, in -group 
favouritism, prosociality, and religious belief. Specifically, I present work from two research 
traditions: firstly, I examine the role of personality system theory (McCrae & Costa, 1999) as a 
model framework for understanding the aetiology of political conservatism (Chapter 3); 
secondly, in three studies I examine the genetic architecture of 1) in -group favouritism, 2) 
prosocial obligations, and 3) religious belief (Chapters 4 -6). Before the bases of this work are 
detailed in full, however, it is necessary to provide an overview of work in the field to date. This 
overview is provided next (Section 1.2), followed by detail concerning the specific questions 
addressed in this thesis (Section 1.3). 
1.2 Origins of Social and Political Attitudes: An Overview 
Confronted with variation across many spheres of social and political attitudes, a natural 
and important question arises concerning the origins of these individual differences: why do 
people vary in their views on issues such as immigrants, the importance of religion in their lives, 
and welfare economics? In the coming sections I review research conducted since the Second 
World War on the antecedents of social and political attitudes. This review is necessarily 
selective (the relevant literature is simply too vast to satisfactorily summarise at this time), 
although broadly representative of major perspectives in the field. Additionally, while major 
works are detailed, these bodies of research do not form a single, cohesive explanation of human 
social and political attitudes; rather they remain a disparate set of ideas concerning the origins of 
socio- political attitudes such as prejudice, political conservatism, and religiosity. Indeed, one of 
the core aims of this thesis is to examine an aetiological model of political attitudes which 
integrates personality, values, and political sentiment (see Chapter 3). 
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I begin this review section with the highly -influential work of Frenkel -Brunswik and 
colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel -Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Building on Freudian 
psychoanalytic models of the mind, these researchers endeavoured to account for fascism in 
terms of the so- called "authoritarian personality ". I then detail classical and operant conditioning 
(Pavlov, 1927; Watson 1924/1931) and social imitation models (e.g. Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 
1961) of human social and political behaviour, before moving toward work initiated in the 1950s 
and 60s examining situational determinants of social attitudes and behaviour, such as the role of 
resource conflict in generating prejudice (e.g. Sherif, 1966). More recent developments (from the 
1980s to present day) are then addressed, incorporating trait -based approaches, such as the Big 
Five model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), as explanations of social and political 
attitudes. Finally, the emergence over the last decade of biological models of attitudes drawing 
from work in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Schaller & Duncan, 2007) and behavioural genetics 
(e.g. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005) are described. 
1.2.1 The Authoritarian Personality 
Following the Nazi atrocities prior to and during World War Two, intense interest 
developed in understanding the origins of prejudice and discrimination (Duckitt, 1992). It was 
from this backdrop that the highly -influential publication, The Authoritarian Personality 
( Adorno et al., 1950) emerged. The authoritarian personality was characterised as a clustering of 
traits (conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti -intraception (a 
general opposition to subjective or imaginative tendencies), superstition and stereotypy, power 
and "toughness ", destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity (projecting the anxiety producing id 
impulse onto "inferior" or minority groups), and exaggerated concerns with sex; p. 228) with the 
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fundamental origins of the authoritarian personality couched within Freudian (1923/1962) 
psychoanalytic theory, and emphasising the importance of early childhood experiences as the 
driving influence on attitudes (Adorno et al., 1950). 
This psychoanalytic interpretation argued that rearing by a strict, authoritarian father 
would facilitate the development of a strong super -ego (conscience, or socially acceptable 
component of mind, and derived from identification with the father; Freud, 1923/1962). A strong 
super -ego, in turn, leads to the repression of unconscious desires. These repressed drives are then 
able to be expressed or satisfied only when the individual projects them onto other people. These 
"others" must be people whom it is acceptable to aggress against, thus minorities are typically 
targeted, particularly if social sanctions are weaker for such aggression. Authoritarians will thus 
often utilise socially accepted prejudices as an outlet for the sublimated needs of their id 
(according to this theory). As Adorno et al. (1950) conclude, "A basically hierarchical, 
authoritarian, exploitative parent -child relationship is apt to carry over into a power -oriented, 
exploitively dependent attitude towards one's sex partner and one's God and may well culminate 
in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate 
clinging to what appears to be strong and a disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the 
bottom ...land] the formation of stereotypes and of ingroup -outgroup cleavages. Conventionality, 
rigidity, repressive denial, and the ensuing break - through of one's weakness, fear and 
dependence are but other aspects of the same fundamental personality pattern, and they can be 
observed in personal life as well as in attitudes toward religion and social issues" (p. 971). 
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1.2.1.1 Challenges to the Authoritarian Personality 
Although The Authoritarian Personality was highly -influential (Duckitt, 1992), a number 
of challenges to its arguments have appeared in the literature. For example, psychoanalytic 
interpretations are commonly argued to be unfalsifiable and thus to be intrinsically of no use as 
accounts of behaviour (e.g. Crews, 1996). Moreover, the theory has been criticised as a source of 
insight into the origins of authoritarianism. McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, and Keyes 
(1999), for instance, reported that right -wing authoritarianism (RWA: Altemeyer, 1981), a 
measure inspired by the work of Adorno et al. (1950), does not show a significant effect of 
shared -environment (which is commonly conceived to reflect rearing conditions), falsifying the 
claim that parental upbringing is a substantive source of the authoritarian personality syndrome. 
As such, while the work of Adorno et al. (1950) generated enormous interest in the prejudice and 
conservatism literature (Duckitt, 1992), it may ultimately be remembered more for its misgivings 
than for its putative insights into prejudice and discrimination (Martin, 2001). 
1.2.2 Conditioning and Modelling 
Alongside the psychoanalytic approach, psychology in the 1950s and 60s saw the 
development of conditioning (e.g. Watson, 1924/1931; Skinner, 1971) and social -learning and 
modelling (e.g. Bandura, 1973) frameworks of human behaviour. These perspectives, too, came 
to bear directly on thinking related to the origins of social and political sensibilities. The Jesuit 
maxim "Give me the child until he is seven, and l will show you the man" is among the most 
well -known suggestions that conditioning is a significant influence on lasting attitudes and 
beliefs. Two prominent models of conditioning (classical and operant) are now briefly 
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introduced, followed by an introduction to social- learning theory and imitation models of attitude 
formation and behaviour. 
1.2.2.1 Classical Conditioning 
Classical conditioning was pioneered by Ivan Pavlov (1927). Pavlov distinguished 
between unconditioned stimuli (US) and their unconditional responses (UR): for instance, food 
(US) and salivation (UR), and the possibility of creating responses to arbitrary "conditioned 
stimuli" - so- called conditioned responses (CR). The conditioned stimulus (CS) is any neutral 
stimulus that does not initially generate the UR, such as the ringing of a bell. Conversely, the US 
evokes an innate, reflexive, response (as inhaling noxious fumes would likely provoke a 
coughing reflex). When the CS is repeatedly presented prior to the appearance of the US, the 
organism develops a response to the CS as if it was the US: for instance, salivating to a bell 
(Pavlov, 1927). 
It was clear to Pavlov and others that this form of conditioning might have important 
implications for understandings concerning the origins of human behaviour, including political 
behaviour. For example, Razran (1940) exposed participants to a variety of slogans, such as 
"Workers of the world, unite!" under one of three conditions: 1) sitting in a neutral setting, 2) 
eating a free lunch, or 3) inhaling noxious odours. Participants subsequently showed increased 
agreement with the slogans paired with a free lunch, and a decrease in agreement with slogans 
paired with noxious smells. Similarly, Stuart, Shimp, and Engle (1987) demonstrated that pairing 
an unknown brand of toothpaste with a positive stimulus (e.g. a pleasant landscape image), 
significantly increased the desirability of the product when compared to a control group. 
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1.2.2.2 Operant Conditioning 
Operant conditioning differs from classical conditioning in that the former does not 
depend on simply linking a pre- existing unconditional response to a conditioned stimulus, but 
rather seeks to generate new responses in the organism, requiring the organism to "operate" on 
the environment in order to receive reinforcement or avoid punishment. Operant conditioning 
became associated with a blank -slate model of human behaviour (Pinker, 2002), suggesting that 
most, if not all, behaviours could be elicited and maintained in any individual with suitable 
conditioning (Skinner, 1971). This idea was perhaps most famously described by John B. 
Watson, who famously stated, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well formed, and my own 
specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to 
become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant -chief, and yes, 
even beggar -man and thief; regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, 
and race of his ancestors" (Watson 1924/1931, p. 104) 1. 
Empirical studies of the efficacy of operant conditioning of attitudes commonly involved 
an experimenter interviewing a participant on his or her attitudes. Throughout the interview the 
experimenter would signal approval (e.g. smiling) or disapproval (e.g. frowning). The participant 
is subsequently re- interviewed after a delay, the prediction being that conditioning (reward and 
punishment) will have led to attitude change. In support of this theory, Insko (1965) reported that 
responses of 70 individuals to an attitude survey were significantly influenced by a telephone 
conversation one week earlier, in which specific opinions had been "rewarded" by the 
confederate interviewer with the verbal reinforcer "good ". 
Interestingly, the next line of this passage, frequently omitted when cited in the literature, indicates Watson was 
somewhat less confident of his position than commonly conceived: "I am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but 
so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years" 
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Perhaps the most notorious example of the use of operant conditioning to shape social 
and political beliefs is the attempt of the Chinese to indoctrinate United Nations prisoners (c. 
20,000 men) towards their own political beliefs, during the Korean War in the 1950s: "The 
prisoners were surprised that they were expected to think of themselves as students of politics 
under the tutelage of their guards. They soon learned, however, that their treatment, and 
therefore their survival, depended on how far their political convictions please their captors" 
(Brown, 1996, p. 54). This attempt at indoctrination was noted to have had short-term effects, as 
captives were swayed by social isolation and continued harassment (Lifton, 1961); however, 
long -term effects were not observed, particularly once these individuals had been returned to 
their homelands (Lifton, 1961), suggesting that the extent to which reinforcement schedules exert 
an influence are perhaps limited in scope, an issue discussed in more detail below. 
1.2.2.3 Challenges to the Conditioning Perspective 
Conditioning has demonstrable capabilities to shape both attitudes and behaviour (e.g. 
Insko, 1965; Razran, 1940). Important questions remain, however, over the extent to which this 
form of influence can account for the variance observed in social and political attitudes. 
Certainly, the radical behaviourist notion that any outcome can be achieved given the appropriate 
reinforcement schedule (Watson, 1924/1931) is likely to be flawed. As Pinker (2002) notes: "this 
theory [leaves us] without a good answer to the question "Why are people smarter than rats? "" 
(p. 21). Cacioppo, Marshall -Goodell, Tassinary, and Petty (1992) observed that conditioning 
effects are stronger for non -words (made -up phrases and neologisms) than for existing real 
words, suggesting that prior knowledge can dilute the influence of conditioning. And recently, 
Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps (2005) reported that extinction to fear conditioning is retarded 
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to racial out -group faces (as compared to racial in -group faces), which the authors interpret as 
evidence for a prepared fear response to a specific target i.e. out -group individuals. This pair of 
fmdings suggests that while conditioning can shape the content of attitudes, this influence is not 
unlimited and, at least in the case of out -group evaluation, is likely applied within an evolved 
socio- cognitive framework for understanding intergroup relations: that is, if out -group 
individuals posed a threat to fitness (Manson & Wrangham, 1991), a mechanism overly sensitive 
to such sources of threat (i.e weighting false positives over false negatives) would likely have 
been adaptive. 
Additionally, differential sensitivities to conditioning (e.g. Eysenck, 1983) suggest that 
not all individuals will respond identically to a given input, in turn suggesting that attitude 
formation may vary as a function of conditionability. In line with this view, Livingston & 
Drwecki (2007) report that individuals who score lower in implicit and explicit measures of 
prejudice are also less likely to develop negative affective associations to neutral stimuli in a 
classical conditioning paradigm (although they were more likely to acquire positive affective 
associations to neutral stimuli). As such, while conditioning models present useful frameworks 
within which to understand aspects of the origins of social and political attitudes and behaviour, 
these models alone cannot explain individual differences in social and political attitudes. 
1.2.2.4 Social Learning and Modelling 
Attitude formation has also been theorised as a social learning process, whereby formal 
reinforcement is unnecessary in order for behaviour to be shaped. Prominent in this field, 
Bandura (1973) argued that modelling, or "observational learning ", is an important component to 
the generation of attitudes and behaviour. Bandura's own 1961 study on the antecedents of 
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aggression in children is a landmark study in the field. In this study, children were first exposed 
to either an adult aggressively playing with a toy "Bobo doll" (e.g. hitting the doll in the face), to 
an adult playing non -aggressively with the doll, or to a control condition where the doll, but no 
adult was present. Following this exposure the children were encouraged to play with a selection 
of desirable toys. Next, the experimenter informed the children that they were no longer allowed 
to play with the toys (an intervention designed to cause frustration). The children were then 
given a group of undesirable toys and the Bobo doll. Bandura and colleagues noted that children 
in the model condition were more likely to play aggressively with the Bobo doll than children in 
either of the control conditions. These findings were taken as evidence that aggressive behaviour 
in children results from the observation (and modelling) of aggressive adult behaviour. 
These studies have subsequently been replicated and extended. For instance, Grusec and 
Skubinski (1970) observed that children were more likely to donate their prizes from a game to 
help a needy child when having been exposed to similar adult behaviour than when exposed to 
adults simply verbalising the desirability of this action. In a later study, Coates, Pusser, and 
Goodman (1976) demonstrated that children who viewed prosocial behaviour on television (e.g. 
Sesame Street) showed a subsequent increase in prosocial behaviour when compared to a control 
group. 
Right -wing authoritarianism2, with links to political conservatism and prejudice 
(Altemeyer, 1988), has been posited to emerge via social learning/modelling. Altemeyer (1988) 
argues that "parents ...serve as powerful models...for their children, so that even if they do not 
intentionally teach certain attitudes, their offspring can still acquire them by observing the 
parents' behaviour, from conversation around the dinner table, and so forth" (p. 55). Altemeyer 
extends the scope of social learning's influence for the acquisition of authoritarian attitudes to 
2 Right -wing authoritarianism is addressed in greater detail in Section 1.2.4 
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teachers, siblings, TV personalities, comic -book heroes, and peers, as well as asserting that 
development of authoritarianism is not age -limited. Both the breadth of possible influences on 
the development of authoritarian attitudes and the malleability across the lifespan contrast this 
view of authoritarianism from the account of Adorno et al. (1950), who emphasised early life 
experiences within the family as fundamental shapers of the authoritarian personality. 
Similarly, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowes (2009) report that political attitudes on issues 
such as political knowledge, vote choice, and economic liberalism are significantly associated 
with parental views and moderated by the degree of parental political involvement. The authors 
suggest that this result is in line with a social learning account of political attitude origins: "As 
expected on the basis of social learning theory, children are more likely to adopt their parents' 
political orientations if the family is highly politicized and if the parents provide consistent cues 
over time" (p. 782). 
1.2.2.5 Challenges to Social Learning and Modelling 
The field of modelling has not, however, been without dispute, especially about causality. 
For instance, Rosenkoetter (1999) reported that time spent watching prosocial sitcoms (e.g. The 
Cosby Show) correlated with mother's reports of the frequency of prosocial behaviour in the 
children. Rosenkoetter, however, raises the important issue of direction of causality, suggesting 
that genetic factors may account for this association, such that "children with a genetic 
predisposition toward empathy and nurturance may select programs, friends, and a host of other 
experiences which are compatible with a prosocial personality" (Rosenkoetter, 1999, p. 990). 
This approach anticipates research detailed in later sections of this chapter and so is not covered 
in further detail here except to say that several studies have recently argued that this familial 
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transmission of political attitudes may reflect genetic inheritance rather than parental modelling 
(e.g. Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005). Questions over the strength of such effects have also been 
raised (e.g. Ferguson, 2010; Gauntlett, 1995), at least within the sphere of media violence. As 
Ferguson (2010) argues, `far from being a powerful lasting influence, modelling effects 
witnessed appear to be small and evaporate quickly" (p. 71). 
1.2.3 The Role of the Situation 
Although psychoanalytic and conditioning/modelling research continued to influence 
psychological thinking, in the 1960s increasing interest was directed towards understanding 
social and political attitudes and behaviour as a function of the situation. Situationism was 
perhaps best articulated, at least with respect to trait psychology, by Walter Mischel (1968) who, 
in his influential monograph, argued that behaviours across settings often correlated only weakly 
(< .30). This observation led Mischel (among others) to conclude that underlying traits were only 
marginal determinants of behaviour, with situational influences providing more powerful effects. 
Situationist thought concerning the origins of prosocial attitudes and behaviour was 
widespread in the 60s and 70s. For instance, Krebs (1978) noted that, `just about everyone will 
help in some situations; just about nobody will help in other contexts; and the same people who 
help in some situations will not help in others" (p. 142). Gergen, Gergen, and Meter (1972), 
reflecting situationist thinking concerning (the putative absence of) traits, argued that research on 
prosociality was little more than a "quagmire of evanescent relations among variables, 
conflicting findings, and low order correlation coefficients" (p. 113). Finally, Latane and Darley 
(1970) claimed "[t]here are reasons why personality should be rather unimportant in 
27 
determining people's reactions to the emergency. For one thing, the situational forces affecting a 
person's decision are so strong" (p. 115). 
Work on the antecedents of prejudice are perhaps the best known examples of situationist 
accounts of the origins of social and political attitudes. "Realistic group conflict" theory (Sherif, 
1966) proposes that conflict arises between groups as a necessary consequence of competition 
over finite resources (Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1956). In the influential Robbers' Cave 
study, Sherif and colleagues investigated intergroup dynamics in a summer -camp for boys. The 
boys were divided into two groups - the self -named "Rattlers" and "Eagles" - and once in -group 
relations were formed were subsequently exposed to intergroup competition. The results were 
striking: hostilities were observed within days such that the experiment was necessarily halted 
and an integration phase was introduced. The results were taken as evidence that specific 
situations can invoke behaviours that might not otherwise be observed. Importantly, the 
researchers noted the results were observed in psychologically -normal individuals, and thus not 
simply the consequence of the experimenters having inadvertently selected for aggressive -types 
who perhaps would have been generally more prone to hostile behaviour. 
The "frustration- aggression" hypothesis is an alternative situationist model with which to 
understand the antecedents of prejudice and discrimination. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and 
Sears (1939) argued that aggression always results from frustration (e.g. following goal 
achievement being impeded), as a mechanism for returning to psychological equilibrium. While 
the target of aggression may be the perceived source of the frustration, enmity can be directed 
towards more abstract (e.g. the prevailing political system), unavailable (e.g. specific political 
figures), or indeterminate (e.g. the economy) entities (c.f. Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). Miller and 
Bugelski (1948) provide support for the frustration- aggression hypothesis showing that 
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adolescent males at a summer camp who had anticipated an evening away from the camp but 
were frustrated in this goal became more aggressive towards minority groups. Additionally, a 
recent meta -analysis of 122 studies concerning displaced frustration and aggression towards 
arbitrary others indicated that "that those who are provoked and unable to retaliate reliably 
respond more aggressively toward an innocent other than those not previously provoked" 
(Marcus- Newhall, Pederson, Carlson, & Miller, 2000, p. 682). 
Last, but certainly not least, a seminal series of studies illuminating the power of 
situations were conducted by Milgram (1974) in light of questions concerning the culpability of 
individuals who were complicit in Nazi atrocities during the Second World War. Milgram's goal 
was to investigate the extent to which the presence of authority figures can lead otherwise 
ordinary individuals to commit acts of violence on other (unknown) individuals. In Milgram's 
initial experiments participants were informed that they were taking part in a study of learning 
where the learner would receive electric shocks for incorrect answers, with these shocks 
administered by the participant. Although the design of the experiment was such that no electric 
shocks were actually delivered (the "learner" was in fact a confederate), the participants were led 
to believe that the shocks were real (the learner was in a separate room with communication 
possible only through an intercom). The results of the studies were striking: the majority of 
participants continued to shock the learner even when the force of the shock increased to levels 
apparently capable of inflicting severe pain. This was in spite of the fact that there were no 
physical constraints placed on the participants: any sign of dissent was merely rebutted with the 
phrases (in order, as appropriate): "Please continue "; "The experiment requires that 
you continue "; "It is absolutely essential that you continue "; "You have no other choice, 
you must go on ". Further independent work has established the robustness of the initial findings 
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(Blass, 1999; Burger, 2009) and while ethical concerns have constrained further studies of this 
kind, it is broadly accepted that deference to authority can induce disturbing behaviours in (at 
least some) otherwise normal individuals (Burger, 2009). 
1.2.3.1 Challenges to the Situationist Perspective 
While powerful insights into human behaviour have been made within the situationist 
paradigm (e.g. Milgram, 1974; Sherif, 1966), important challenges to this framework have been 
voiced. Most prominently, and explored in greater detail below (see Section 1.2.4), trait 
psychologists have argued that while behaviour can certainly vary as a function of circumstance, 
this perspective understates (or wholly neglects) the fact that stable individual differences exist 
(Bowers, 1973; Jost, 2008). As such, while situations influence behaviour, and may play a large 
role in influencing population level rates of behaviour (e.g. scarcity of resources provoking 
intergroup conflict), individual differences exist that influence how individuals respond to these 
situational factors (Bowers, 1973). As such, situationism, while undoubtedly generating critical 
understandings into human social behaviour, cannot form a complete explanation of the origins 
of social and political attitudes. 
1.2.4 The Return of Individual Differences 
The impact of work in the 1960s and 70s emphasising the situational determinants of 
social and political attitudes resulted in a situation where, as Jost (2006) notes, "once thriving 
research programs on individual differences in political orientation._.lay dormant for almost two 
decades" (p. 652). Recently, however, research has begun to re -affirm the stability of attitudes 
across time, and between individuals, as well as the coherent organisation of attitudes around a 
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limited number of underlying themes or values constructs. While not necessarily denying the role 
of reinforcement or other social influences, this move towards what could ultimately be 
described as an individual differences approach to socio- political psychology has flourished in 
recent years with considerable work conducted into the underlying individual differences 
generating stable variation in political and social attitudes (e.g. Jost, 2006). 
1.2.4.1 Personality 
The re- emergence of the interest in individual differences as predictors of attitudes 
coincided with the broad consensus being reached concerning the validity of a five- factor model 
of personality traits (i.e. agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and 
openness to experience; Costa & McCrae, 1992), a taxonomy that has been widely used in recent 
years as a beliefs. Of major dimensions of 
personality, openness has demonstrated robust associations with political orientation, with high 
levels of openness correlating around .30 with liberalism (Carney et al., 2008; McCrae, 1996; 
Trapnell, 1994; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004). Traits other than openness have shown mixed 
results. For example, modest associations have been reported between conscientiousness and 
political orientation (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Mondak & Halperin, 2008); however, 
other studies have found no evidence for association (e.g. Alford & Hibbing, 2007). And while 
some authors have reported modest effects of agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroticism on 
political orientation (e.g. Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & Fraley, 2007), other studies have 
failed to find significant associations between these traits and political orientation (Alford & 
Hibbing, 2007; Carney et al., 2008; Mehrabian, 1996; Trapnell, 1994). These mixed results are 
notable in line with common assumptions that personality is a core influence on political 
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attitudes and behaviour (Sniderman, 1975; Winter, 2003). Indeed, this issue is the focus of work 
reported in Chapter 3 that attempts to provide a novel explanation for these mixed results and 
integrate personality and political attitudes into a single model. 
1.2.4.2 Attitudes and Values 
In addition to the five -factor model, a range of attitudinal and values constructs have been 
proposed as predictors of social and political beliefs, notably social dominance orientation, right - 
wing authoritarianism, and, more recently, moral foundations theory: each of these frameworks, 
along with links to social and political attitudes, are detailed below. 
Social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is 
conceptualised as a measure of individual differences in levels of group -based discrimination and 
domination and emerged from social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Initial work 
on SDO demonstrated reliable associations with a wide range of social and political attitudes: 
individuals with higher SDO scores were more prejudiced, conservative, and patriotic (Pratto et 
al., 1994). Conversely, those individuals scoring low in SDO were more favourable towards 
womens' and gay rights. These results have been replicated and extended in many subsequent 
studies linking SDO to, for instance, prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 
1998; McFarland, 1999) and extreme right -wing political views (Dambrun, Maisonneuve, 
Duarte, & Guimond, 2002). 
Right -wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) is conceptualised as a 
cluster of correlated traits: 1) Authoritarian submission - submissiveness to authorities who are 
perceived to be legitimate in one's society; 2) Authoritarian aggression - directed against 
deviants and out -groups, perceived to be targets according to established authorities; 3) 
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Conventionalism - adherence to the norms endorsed by society and belief that others should also 
adhere. RWA has shown robust associations to prejudice (e.g. Altemeyer, 1998; Lambert & 
Chasteen, 1997; Lippa & Arad, 1999; McFarland et al., 1993) and conservatism (Altemeyer, 
1996). Importantly, RWA appears to influence social and political attitudes independently of 
SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a): controlling for SDO, RWA predicted dislike for out -groups 
described as deviant/socially threatening, whereas SDO independently (of RWA) predicted 
dislike for out -groups described as socio- economically disadvantaged. 
More recently, Haidt and colleagues have proposed "moral foundations" theory as a 
model framework for understanding social and political attitudes (e.g. Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
According to these authors, moral behaviour is organised around five core foundations: harm 
(minimising harm to others), fairness (maximising fairness to all), in -group loyalty (the 
importance of the in- group), authority (respect for status and hierarchy), and purity (avoiding 
impure or disgusting acts /entities). These five facets of morality, in turn, correlate to form two 
higher -order moral factors of "individualizing" (the combination of harm and fairness) and 
"binding" (the combination of authority, in -group loyalty, and purity; Graham et al., 2009). 
Importantly, both individualizing and binding have been shown to account for significant 
variance in liberalism -conservatism in both the United States and UK (Graham et al., 2009) and 
in The Netherlands (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), with more liberal individuals tending to report 
lower scores on binding and higher scores on individualizing. 
1.2.4.3 Challenges to the Individual Differences Perspective 
Although the individual differences approach to social and political attitudes has yielded 
a number of robust findings (e.g. SDO and RWA as predictors of prejudice; Sibley & Duckitt, 
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2008), this perspective has rarely integrated traits and environmental moderators into a single 
model. Some recent attempts to incorporate interactive components within an individual 
differences framework have begun to yield fruitful results (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b); however, 
more work of this kind will be needed to generate fine -grained understandings of the origins of 
social and political attitudes. Additionally, the role of basic traits of personality as an influence 
on social and political attitudes is presently unclear (e.g. Alford & Hibbing, 2007), a fact that 
may reflect more complex and/or indirect effects of personality on social and political attitudes 
(Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & 
Anderson, 2010), an issue that is explored in detail in Chapter 3. 
1.2.5 The Evolutionary Psychology of Social and Political Attitudes 
Alongside the "re- discovery" of individual differences, in the last two decades, 
evolutionary theory has become an increasingly powerful framework in psychology (Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 2002) and this mode of thought has inspired evolutionary 
accounts of socio- political behaviour arguing that selective pressures operating on humans 
equipped our minds with a specific repertoire of behaviour, some components of which are 
relevant to social and political attitudes. For example, Schaller and Duncan (2007) have argued 
that humans are equipped with a "behavioural immune system" designed to minimise pathogen 
threats of which the implications for social and political attitudes include biases of attention and 
memory toward individuals with physical deformities (Ackerman et al., 2009; Kurzban & Leary, 
2001; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003), cross -cultural variation in food preferences and taboos 
(Fessier & Navarrete, 2003), religious diversity (i.e. diversity is greatest in regions of high 
pathogen load; Fincher & Thornhill, 2008), and aversions toward out -group individuals on 
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grounds they may transmit disease (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004; Hodson & 
Costello, 2007). 
The "tribal instinct" hypothesis (Van Vugt & Park, 2008) is an evolutionary model of 
intergroup relations positing that adaptations for group life have been sculpted by natural 
selection. Intergroup conflict is understood to have been reasonably common in ancestral 
environments (Alexander, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988), and it is estimated that intergroup 
conflict claimed the lives of up to 30% of ancestral men (Keeley, 1996), which would have 
plausibly led to selection for traits able to enhance fitness in such hostile environments, such as 
in -group favouritism (e.g. the ability to affiliate enhances capability in war and hunting) and out - 
group derogation (e.g. "get them before they get us! "). Kurzban and Leary (2001) note that 
"membership in a potentially cooperative group should activate a psychology of conflict and 
exploitation of out -group members - a feature that distinguishes adaptations for coalitional 
psychology from other cognitive systems" (p. 195). Support for the tribal instinct hypothesis 
includes the observation that people preferentially provide resources to in -group over out -group 
members, even when group membership is designated based on an arbitrary criterion, such as 
painting preferences (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
While the above examples of evolutionary thinking concerning social attitudes have 
focused on intergroup behaviour, a sophisticated model concerning the evolution of normative 
and prosocial behaviour has recently been posited by Chudek and Henrich (2011). These authors 
argue that gene - culture co- evolution is responsible for both the emergence of norm mechanisms 
and, subsequently, prosocial attitudes and behaviour. The proposed model suggests the 
following: firstly, fitness advantages would have been bestowed on those who were able to use 
others as exemplars in order to overcome the obstacle of having to rediscover important 
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technological or behavioural strategies. This early form of conformity coupled with the 
emergence of cultural rules likely creates a selective pressure for the emergence of more 
advanced norm detection and adoption mechanisms. Finally, between -group competition extends 
and spreads prosocial norms as groups best able to instantiate such social codes out -compete 
those who do not and in doing so transmit the successful cultural strategies. While this model is 
largely untested to date, it provides an attractive and sophisticated framework for understanding 
the origins of human prosociality. 
1.2.5.1 Challenges to the Evolutionary Psychology Perspective 
While some intriguing lines of enquiry have emerged from an evolutionary psychology 
perspective of social and political attitudes, it is currently unclear how and why these adaptations 
create variance in social and political attitudes. In line with standard evolutionary thinking (e.g. 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2005), psychological adaptations are postulated to be species -typical 
mechanisms. The question arises, then, of how individual differences in social and political 
attitudes might be generated from these adaptations. The response to this criticism has been that 
it misrepresents the fundamental tenets of evolutionary psychology. As noted by Tooby and 
Cosmides (2005), "genes are regulatory elements that use environments to construct organisms. 
Thus, every single component of an organism is codetermined by the interaction of genes with 
environments. Moreover, some of those components are computational mechanisms, designed to 
produce behavior on the basis of information from the environment. Seen in this way, it is 
senseless to ask whether kin detection or language acquisition or snake phobias are caused by 
the genes or the environment: These phenomena are caused by evolved mechanisms that operate 
on information from the environment in particular ways, and these evolved mechanisms were 
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themselves constructed by the interaction of genes with the environment" (p. 34). Accordingly, 
variance in attitudes towards foreigners might be generated via the interaction between a 
coalitional /group member encoding adaptation (e.g. Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001) and 
environmental input, such as resource shortages (Sherif, 1966). However, while this solution is 
plausible, work specifying the precise architecture of this system is still required to fully (or at 
least better) account for the origins of variation in social and political attitudes. 
1.2.6 Genetic Bases of Social and Political Attitudes 
As previous sections will have shown (with the exception of evolutionarily inspired 
work), the bulk of research concerning the origins of social and political attitudes has implicitly 
assumed or explicitly asserted that environmental factors drive social and political attitudes: even 
the broadly consensus view that social attitudes are largely stable (Jost, 2006; although 
challenged by some, e.g. Converse, 1964) has not removed the implicit assumption that this 
stability is of environmental origins. As Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) note, `political 
science debates concerning the source of political attitudes and behaviors have been over timing, 
over whether attitudes and behaviors are primarily shaped early in life or by more proximate 
occurrences. Conspicuously absent is consideration of the possibility that certain attitudes and 
behaviors may be at least partially attributable to genetic factors" (p. 154). This view is echoed 
outside of political science and within the attitudes literature more broadly: in a review of the 
attitudes literature, Tesser and Shaffer (1990) reported no references to genetic explanations of 
attitude responses3. Recently, however, the contention that genetic factors may underpin a 
significant proportion of variance in social and political attitudes has been tested empirically, 
3 However, Tesser and Shaffer (1990) overlook important work including Eaves & Eysenck (1974) and Martin et al. 
(1986) 
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with early evidence suggesting that a range of attitudes with relevance to political life contain a 
genetic substrate. 
1.2.6.1 Genetics of Political Attitudes and Behaviour 
Perhaps the earliest genetically informative study of socio- political attitudes was 
conducted by Eaves and Eysenck (1974) who, in pioneering work published in Nature and using 
a classical twin design4, showed that self -reported radicalism (vs. conservatism) and tough - 
mindedness (vs. tender -mindedness) were both substantially influenced by genetic factors: 
heritability estimates for these traits were .65 and .54, respectively. However, the heterodox 
findings of Eaves and Eysenck (1974) were largely suppressed in the literature, in large part 
because of extended criticisms of genetic explanations of social behaviour and attitudes (e.g. 
Schwartz & Schwartz, 1974): biological explanations at this time were simply not en vogue 
(McGuire, 1968; Segerstrale, 2000). 
Some 12 years later a second high -impact article appeared (PNAS; Martin et al., 1986) 
supporting the original findings of Eaves and Eysenck (1974), and extending the scope of 
heritable influences on social and political attitudes to include the Wilson- Patterson scale 
(Wilson & Patterson, 1968), a catch -phrase measurement instrument tapping a range of social 
and political issues. A modest trickle of results followed this finding including work 
demonstrating genetic influences underlying religious beliefs and prosociality (both detailed in 
later sections); however, mainstream consideration of these results was delayed until Alford, 
Funk, and Hibbing (2005) revisited the earlier Martin et al. (1986) findings, presenting re- 
analyses of these data to a social and political science audience. 
a See Chapter 2 for a full description of these methods 
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A steady body of work has emerged into the literature in recent years replicating and 
extending these initial findings of genetic influence on social and political attitudes. Hatemi et al. 
(2007) reported that vote choice is heritable, but that the majority of this genetic influence on 
vote choice is accountable through the heritability of political attitudes. Fowler, Baker, and 
Dawes (2008) observed that actual voter turnout is also under significant genetic control. 
Strength of affiliation, or partisanship, to a party (irrespective of the particular party) is 
substantially heritable, although these genetic effects on political attitudes do not appear to 
emerge until young adulthood (> 20 years; Hatemi et al., 2009). Finally, Hatemi et al. (2010), 
utilising an extended twin design and so accounting for standard concerns over limitations in the 
CTD (see Chapter 2 for more detail), report findings that closely mirror those from CTD studies, 
and note that ` for most political and social attitudes, genetic influences account for an even 
greater proportion of individual differences than reported by studies using more limited data and 
more elementary estimation techniques" (Hatemi et al., 2010, p. 798). 
At the time of writing, few molecular genetic studies of political attitudes and behaviour 
have been reported. Of these early studies, two genes (monoamine oxidase and serotonin 
polymorphisms) have been linked to voting participation (Fowler & Dawes, 2008), and 
dopamine receptor gene variation for partisan attachment (Dawes & Fowler, 2009). And a recent 
study addressing gene- environment interaction (GxE) reported a moderating effect of friendship 
on the influence of dopamine polymorphisms on political attitudes (Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & 
Fowler, 2010). Finally, while candidate gene studies allow tests of specific loci with putative 
links to politically- relevant traits, genome -wide studies allow a far greater number of loci to be 
examined for association with a given trait in an exploratory (hypothesis -free) manner (Wang, 
Barratt, Clayton, & Todd, 2005). Hatemi and colleagues recently conducted the first such study 
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for political attitudes (Hatemi et al., 2011), performing a genome -wide linkage study on political 
conservatism. Their results revealed three peaks reaching genomewide significance (LOD > 3), 
with a further peak `suggestive' of linkage (LOD > 2.5). These four loci independently 
accounted for between 9.4% and 12.9% of the total phenotypic variation in political 
conservatism (measured as the first principle component emerging from Wilson -Patterson 
items), although the authors suggest these figures are likely to be biased upward on account of 
capitalizing on chance deviations. 
1.2.6.2 Genetics of Prosociality 
A growing body of research has also demonstrated that prosociality possesses a heritable 
component. Rushton et al. (1986) reported that 50% of the variance in altruism measured by the 
Self -Report Altruism Scale (SRAS; Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981) was accounted for by 
additive genetic influences. This study was significant also for its demonstration that the shared - 
environment (which includes familial effects) exerts no influence on prosocial behaviour. A 
subsequent study in an independent sample of 322 twin pairs broadly replicated this initial 
finding, reporting similar genetic effects on prosociality (Rushton, 2004). Similar fmdings have 
been found in children: Knafo and Plomin (2006) found that genetic effects influencing prosocial 
behaviour in infants /children at 2 years and 7 years accounted for 32% and 61% of phenotypic 
variance, respectively: over the same time -span shared -environment effects were seen to 
decrease from 47 to 3 %. Furthermore, cross -cultural validation of these fmdings in pre- 
adolescents has also been reported in Korean twins (Hur & Rushton, 2007). However, not all 
studies have reported genetic effects on prosocial attitudes. For instance, Krueger, Hicks, and 
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McGue (2001) observed that heritable effects on a modified version of the SRAS were non- 
significant in males (female data was not analysed in this study). 
Recent work has also begun to address the genetic and environmental contributions to 
social preferences in games drawn from the experimental economics literature. Wallace, 
Cesarini, Lichtenstein, and Johannesson (2007) report that 40% of variation in ultimatum game 
(UG) responding is explained by additive genetic effects. (In the UG, the Player 1 proposes how 
to divide the sum between the two players, with Player 2 able to either accept or reject this offer. 
If Player 2 rejects, neither player receives anything. If Player 2 accepts, the money is split 
according to the proposal). Similar results have been reported for behaviour in the trust game 
( Cesarini et al., 2008), where participants are bestowed with an initial endowment of which to 
send a chosen proportion to another participant (the trustee). The sent amount is then multiplied 
by some factor and the trustee decides how much of the received sum to return to the investor. 
Building on genetically informative findings from twin studies, molecular genetic work 
has sought to identify loci implicated in traits such as empathy and cooperation. Much of this 
work has focused on two specific candidates - oxytocin and vasopressin - largely due to robust 
findings linking these neuromodulator peptide hormones to vertebrate social behaviour, 
including pair bonding, aggression, and social memory (Lee, Macbeth, Pagani, & Young, 2009). 
Rodrigues, Saslow, Garcia, John, and Keltner (2009) reported a significant association between a 
single oxytocin receptor (OXTR) single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP; rs53576) and 
behavioural (Reading the Mind in the Eyes task; Baron -Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001) and self -report dispositional empathy: individuals homozygous for the G allele 
(GG) were more empathic than those individuals with one or two copies of the A allele 
(AG /AA). Tost et al. (2010) supported these findings reporting that individuals homozygous for 
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the G allele for the rs53576 SNP have significantly higher scores than heterozygotes or 
individuals homozygous for the A allele on the reward -dependence sub -scale of the 
Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (Cloninger, 1987), which taps degree of sociability, 
reliance on social approval, and sensitivity to interpersonal feedback. Furthermore, Tost et al. 
(2010) report that A allele individuals possessed significantly decreased hypothalamic gray 
matter and increased right amygdala volume (in males only), with a significant negative 
correlation between local amygdala volume and individual reward -dependency scores in the total 
sample (r = -.19). A further set of OXTR SNPs (although rs53576 was not included) were 
significantly associated with prosocial behaviour (Israel et al., 2009), as measured by the dictator 
game and the social values orientation task. 
Variation in the arginine vasopressin receptor gene has also shown links to behaviour in 
experimental games. Knafo et al. (2008) reported that the proportion of money offered in a 
dictator game was predicted by the length of AVPRIa RS3 microsatellite repeat element: 
individuals with longer RS3 alleles allocated more money than individuals with shorter alleles, 
although no replication of this finding has been reported to date. 
Polymorphisms in genes influencing dopamine have also been linked to prosocial 
behaviour. Bachner -Melman et al. (2005) found that self -report prosociality is significantly 
associated with the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene: relative to the 7- repeat allele, 
individuals with the 4- repeat allele of DRD4 48 bp VNTR reported a higher score of 
prosociality. Zhong et al. (2010) support these findings showing that variation in DRD4 is 
significantly associated with social preferences in Chinese individuals measured using the 
Ultimatum Game paradigm. In this study the 2- repeat allele was shown to predict significantly 
lower levels of minimum acceptable offers than the 4- repeat allele: the 7- repeat is rare in the 
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Chinese population (Ding et al., 2002) and the 2- repeat is considered intermediate to the 4- repeat 
and the 7- repeat allele (Asghari et al., 1995). 
Finally, recent work has linked the COMT Va1158Met polymorphism to prosocial 
behaviour. Individuals with at least one Val allele donated approximately twice as much money 
to a developing country's childrens' charity when compared with those participants without a 
Val allele (Reuter, Frenzel, Walter, Markett, & Montag, 2010). 
1.2.6.3 Genetics of Religiosity 
Perhaps most surprising among genetic research into social and political attitudes has 
been the finding of heritable variation underlying religious beliefs. In an early study, Martin et al. 
(1986) reported significant genetic effects on attitudes such as observance of the Sabbath, 
authority of the church, and truthfulness of the Bible, although significant shared -environment 
effects were also observed. In a sample of reared -apart MZ twins and reared -together MZ and 
DZ twins, Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, and Tellegen (1990) supported these earlier 
findings showing that religious attitudes, importance, and interests are significantly genetically 
influenced. Provocative even twenty years later (e.g. Charney, 2008), the authors further argued 
that it is time to "discard the a priori assumption that individual differences in religious and 
other social attitudes are solely influenced by environmental factors" (p. 141). Not all studies 
have shown significant genetic effects on religious beliefs. For instance, Kendler, Gardner, and 
Prescott (1997) observed in a sample of females that additive genetic factors were modest in 
determining personal devotion (items including the "Importance of religious beliefs ") and at zero 
for personal conservatism (items including "Literal belief in [the] Bible "). However, subsequent 
work has largely corroborated these earlier positive findings indicating that religious beliefs and 
43 
practices are indeed heritable (Bouchard, McGue, Lykken, & Tellegen, 1999; Bradshaw & 
Ellison, 2008; D'Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes, & Spilka, 1999; Koenig, McGue, Krueger, & 
Bouchard, 2005; Vance, Maes, & Kendler, 2010), but that shared- environment factors are also 
present, and of particular importance in determining affiliation (D'Onofrio et al., 1999). 
1.2.6.4 Challenges to the Genetic Perspective 
Intense criticism of the reported associations between genetic factors and political 
attitudes has been received from some quarters within social science (e.g. Beckwith & Morris, 
2008; Charney 2008a; Charney 2008b). Indeed, it has been suggested (somewhat dismissively) 
that if the results of twin research were true "it would require nothing less than a revision of our 
understanding of all of human history, much, if not most of political science, sociology, 
anthropology, and psychology, as well as, perhaps, our understanding of what it means to be 
human" (Charney, 2008a, p. 300). Challenges to the underlying assumptions of the classical twin 
design (CTD) are not new to the literature (e.g. Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984); as such, this 
issue is revisited in Chapter 2 where a more detailed discussion of the methodological strengths 
and shortcomings of the CTD are outlined in anticipation of further socio- genetic work reported 
in later chapters of this thesis. However, it is noteworthy at this stage that robust responses to 
challenges from both Charney (2008a) and Beckwith and Morris (2008), among others, have 
been presented in the literature (e.g. Medland & Hatemi, 2009). 
1.3 The Current Thesis: Outstanding Questions 
With this review of the literature in mind, where do we fmd ourselves with regards to the 
origins of social and political attitudes? While the literature is vast, it is apparent, as noted above, 
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that previous work, while offering predictive power (to greater or lesser extents) of social and 
political attitudes, cannot (at least singularly) fully account for the bases of such attitudes. 
Clearly, then, important avenues have not yet been explored in the field, and pivotal questions 
remain. In the sections below, I briefly outline a series of inter -related issues in the social and 
political attitudes literature that have either been neglected thus far, or have presented equivocal 
conclusions where work has been conducted: attempts to provide additional insight into these 
issues form the basis for the current thesis. Specifically, I address two broad issues: firstly, the 
role of personality as an influence on political conservatism (Aim 1); Secondly, the influence and 
structure of genetic factors on social attitudes, including in -group favouritism, prosocial 
obligations, and religious belief (Aims 2 -4). 
1.3.1 Aim 1: Testing a Personality System Model of Political Conservatism 
In recent years, personality has been a major candidate for understanding individual 
differences in political and social attitudes. While some findings have been robust in the 
literature, such as the role of openness in explaining prejudice (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and 
conservatism (McCrae & Sutin, 2009), work in this domain has produced mixed results (e.g. 
Alford & Hibbing, 2007) despite the mostly unchallenged view in the field that personality is a 
core influence on political attitudes and behaviour (Sniderman, 1975; Winter, 2003). One 
possible resolution to these mixed results may be found in considering personality's role in 
determining social and political attitudes within a personality systems framework (introduced in 
detail in Chapter 3; McCrae and Costa, 1999), whereby personality affects an intermediary layer 
of values (or characteristic adaptations), which in turn influence political attitudes and behaviour. 
Work reported in Chapter 3 utilises this personality systems approach and tests the theory that 
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personality exerts significant effects on political conservatism, but that an intermediary layer of 
values are required for this influence to be observed. 
1.3.2 Aim 2: Determining the Genetic Architecture of In -group Favouritism 
As previous sections have described, the origins of prejudice have been a major target of 
research for at least the last 70 years (e.g Adorno et al., 1950); however, to date no study has yet 
addressed a number of critical questions concerning the genetic architecture of ethnocentrism, or 
in -group favouritism, particularly in light of work showing that related social attitudes contain a 
genetic basis (e.g. Alford et al., 2005). Thus, important outstanding questions include the 
following: 1) Is in -group favouritism heritable ?; 2) If so, are there multiple heritable components 
to in -group favouritism, such as towards one's race and one's chosen in- groups (e.g. religion)? 3) 
And if race favouritism is heritable, does a common affiliative mechanism account for this 
genetic basis, or do distinct heritable factors to race favouritism exist over and above any 
common mechanism? Chapter 4 addresses each of these questions. 
1.3.3 Aim 3: Determining the Magnitude of Genetic Effects and Comorbidities 
Underlying Prosocial Obligations 
As noted above, several genetically informative studies of prosocial attitudes and 
behaviour exist in the literature; however, important questions, too, remain in this domain. 
Firstly, while a number of studies have reported heritable effects underlying prosocial attitudes 
(e.g. Rushton, 2004), these results have not been reported by all (e.g. Krueger et al., 2001). As 
such, there is a need to further examine the relative genetic and environmental contributions to 
prosocial attitudes in order to robustly establish the aetiology of these traits. Secondly, while 
studies to date have addressed the heritable basis of prosociality in the domain of welfare 
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concern for others, little is known of the role of genes in determining prosocial obligations in 
broader domains, such as towards work and civic duties: is variation in these domains under 
genetic control? Thirdly, does prosocial sentiment generalise across distinct domains of social 
life, such as at work, in civic -life, and with respect to the general welfare of others, and if so does 
this common prosocial obligation factor have a genetic basis? Chapter 5 addresses each of these 
questions. 
1.3.4 Aim 4: Explaining the Heritable Bases of Religiosity: Can Religiosity Genes be 
Reduced to Community and Existential Needs? 
Finally, while genetic influences have been shown to underpin religious beliefs (e.g. 
Koenig et al., 2005), the nature of the psychological mechanism(s) through which these 
biological factors are manifest is presently unknown. As such, critical information concerning 
the reducibility of religiosity to more fundamental (and non -theological) socio- cognitive traits 
and motivations (e.g. Boyer, 2003; Graham & Haidt, 2010), such as 1) needs for community 
integration and 2) needs for existential certainty, are currently absent in the literature. Chapter 6 
addresses the question of whether heritable variance underlying these non -theological variables 
can account for the genetic bases underlying religious belief 
47 
Chapter 2 - Behaviour Genetic Methodology: A Brief Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a concise introduction to behaviour genetic 
methodology, with a specific focus on the capabilities and limitations of the classical twin design 
to elucidate genetic and environmental contributions on psychological traits. This background 
provides important methodological information underpinning the genetically informative studies 
conducted for this thesis and described in Chapters 4 -6. In the sections that follow I outline 1) 
basic principles of genetic theory, 2) the classical twin design method, 3) the key assumptions 
and limitations of the classical twin design, and 4) extensions of the classical twin design to the 
multivariate case, and the advantages of this advanced design. (Note: information on the specific 
models and analytical strategies used in this thesis is presented, as appropriate, in Chapters 4 -6). 
2.1 Basic Principles of Genetic Theory 
2.1.1 Mendel and the Laws of Heredity 
Although his research went largely unrecognised in his lifetime, Gregor Mendel's (1866) 
work, rediscovered by de Vries, Correns, and Von Tschermak at the turn of the 20th century (cf. 
Bowler, 2003), underpins the field of genetics. Mendel's great contribution emerged from his 
meticulous cross -breeding experiments with plants of different species. He observed that when 
crossing two qualitatively distinct plants, such as those yielding smooth vs. wrinkled peas, the 
resulting offspring was not a blend, as consensus would have predicted at the time. Rather, the 
progeny all yielded smooth peas (Mendel, 1866). This finding falsified the then accepted wisdom 
of blended inheritance (cf Charlesworth & Charlesworth, 2009; Plomin, Defries, McClearn, & 
McGuffm, 2001). Mendel, however, had the crucial foresight to allow the offspring of the cross- 
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breeding experiment to self -fertilise in order to study their progeny. What he observed was that 
three quarters of this generation's peas had smooth seeds, with the remaining quarter possessing 
wrinkled skins: the "factor" underlying wrinkled seeds had not disappeared following the first 
generation of breeding, but instead had been, in some manner, "hidden ". 
To explain this finding, Mendel argued that each individual possessed two "elements" 
(what geneticists now term "alleles "), one from each parent, which typically co -exist in pairs but 
crucially are segregated in sex cells. One of these alleles was reasoned to be dominant, that is to 
say expressed irrespective of the status of the other allele. This would mean that each of the 
progeny of Mendel's cross -breeding experiment would have possessed the dominant allele 
coding for smooth skins and the recessive allele coding for wrinkled skins. Following self - 
fertilisation, and bearing in mind that each parent provides just one of its two alleles to its 
progeny, the subsequent generation should yield a population with three quarters smooth- skinned 
peas and one quarter wrinkled- skinned peas. These observations helped to explain the observed 
data and inspired what became known as Mendel's Law of Segregation. 
Mendel took this work further showing that cross -breeding two traits (at least those traits 
with a dominance expression) produced 9:3:3:1 ratios in subsequent generations. This ratio is 
consistent with the conclusion that alleles of different genes are independently inherited 
(although this is only true for genes that are not in linkage disequilibrium with each other; 
Falconer & MacKay, 1996). As such, this discovery became known as Mendel's Law of 
Independent Assortment. 
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2.1.2 Quantitative Traits 
While Mendelian traits provided an elegant account of many traits, most traits of interest 
to social and behavioural scientists (e.g. personality, intelligence, social and political attitudes) 
are quantitative in nature: that is to say, continuously distributed and influenced by the combined 
action of multiple genetic loci, a fact intimated by the lack of Mendelian patterns of inheritance 
for such traits (Plomin et al., 2001). In addition, environmental influences are likely to contribute 
to observed variation in traits, further blurring the pattern of inheritance. 
This distinction between Mendelian or single -allele traits and continuous variance led to 
disputes in the literature which were not resolved until the seminal work of Fisher (1918) in 
combining both the mechanical simplicity of Mendelian transmission of alleles with the 
statistical implications of phenotypes which involved the addition of the effects of two or more 
such genes. In modern work, quantitative traits, are handled behaviourally by examining the 
pattern of covariance among groups differing in their genetic and environmental similarity; for 
instance, siblings and cousins, adopted siblings and twins, or most commonly, monozygotic, or 
identical, and dizygotic, or fraternal, twin- pairs; the classical twin design (Neale & Cardon, 
1992). Given such groups, it is possible to estimate more or less complex patterns of 
transmission and the relative proportions of phenotypic variance resulting from genetic and 
environmental influences (e.g. Falconer & MacKay, 1996; Fisher, 1918; Mather & Jinks, 1982; 
Plomin et al., 2001). 
2.2 Why Twins? The Variance Components Approach 
As mentioned above, estimation of the respective contributions of genetic and 
environmental influences for a given trait is typically performed using twin or pedigree data and 
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the variance components approach (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 1999; Neale & Cardon, 1992). 
In the classic twin design, observed variance in a given trait /measure is partitioned into three of 
the following four components: additive genetic effects (A), non -additive genetic effects (D) or 
shared -environment effects (C), and unique- environment effects (E): if data is limited to twins 
reared together, shared -environment and dominant genetic effects are confounded and cannot be 
estimated within the same model. Additive genetic effects simply refer to the effect exerted by 
the sum of the individual effects of all the genes involved (Falconer & MacKay, 1996), with non - 
additive genetic effects referring to the situation where the total gene effect differs from the sum 
of the individual effects of these genes. These non -additive effects stem either from interactions 
within a gene (dominance) or between genes (epistasis; Falconer & MacKay, 1996). Shared - 
environment effects are those common to individuals of a twin pair (or family). Shared - 
environment effects include (but are not limited to) variables such as socioeconomic status and 
parental style; they serve to increase the similarity of both dizygotic (DZ) twins and monozygotic 
(MZ) twins. Unique -environment effects are those influences that serve to make members of 
twin pairs less similar to each other. These effects are in principle wide -reaching and might 
include both differential exposures to teachers, employment, romantic partners, and health, as 
well as differential perceptions of events to which both members of a twin pair were exposed. 
Measurement error is also subsumed within this component of variance, unless multiple 
measures are conducted to remove this bias. 
Estimates for the A, C, and E variance components are derived using the following logic: 
MZ twins raised in the same family share both 100% of the variance in their genetic matter and 
all of the effects of the shared -environment. As such, any differences arising between them are 
thus effects of the unique environment. Accordingly, the correlation observed between MZ twins 
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is an estimate of A + C. DZ twins have a common shared -environment; however these 
individuals only share (on average) 50% of the variance in their genetic matter. As such, the 
correlation between DZ twins is an estimate of ' /2A + C. From this information, the following 
formulas can be derived (where rmz and rth are the correlations of the trait in MZ and DZ twins, 
respectively): 
rmz =A +C 
rdz= ' /2A +C 
Because the difference between the MZ and DZ correlations occurs entirely because of a 
halving of the genetic similarity (assuming no asymmetry in environmental similarities for either 
zygosity class, or no non -additive genetic effects), A is simply twice the difference between the 
MZ and DZ correlations: 
A = 2 (rmZ - rdz) 
As the MZ correlation reflects the full effect of A and C, an estimate of E can be derived 
by subtracting the magnitude of this correlation from 1: 
E=1-rmZ 
Finally, an estimate of C is derived as follows: 
C=rmz-A=2 raz-rmz 
Although the above derivation of the A, C, and E variance components is valuable as an 
illustration of the underlying logic of such analyses, it is noteworthy that modern computing 
technology allows sophisticated analytical tools, such as maximum likelihood estimation (Neale 
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& Cardon, 1992), to provide parameter estimates for variance components. This approach has the 
considerable advantage of allowing researchers to test competing nested models (such as by 
using the likelihood ratio test), as well as to model parameters for multiple variables 
simultaneously (see below: Section 2.3). 
2.3 Extensions to the Multivariate Case 
While Section 2.2 detailed the basis for decomposing the respective genetic and 
environmental influences on a given trait, as noted above, analytical tools are now available to 
model multiple variables simultaneously. These methodological developments provide 
fundamental advantages for researchers seeking to understand the genetic architecture of 
complex traits. For example, it becomes possible to demonstrate that heritable bases 
underpinning anti -social behaviour are also associated with general cognitive ability (Koenen, 
Caspi, Moffitt, Rijsdijk, & Taylor, 2006), or whether genetic effects increasing one's sense of 
civic and work obligation also serve to increase one's concern for the welfare of anonymous 
others (see Chapter 5 for more detail on this specific issue). The same logic can be applied to 
environmental effects: for example, do common environmental influences underpin different 
aspects of religious belief and behaviour (Vance, Maes, & Kendler, 2010) ?5 
2.4 Challenges to and Limitations of the Classical Twin Design 
2.4.1 Equal- Environment Assumption 
As with almost all behavioural methodology, the classical twin design (CTD) rests upon a 
set of core assumptions that require careful consideration. Perhaps the most well -known of these, 
largely through sustained criticism of the CTD method for perceived violations (Beckwith & 
5 Accordingly to Vance et al (2010), this question can be answered in the affirmative. 
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Morris, 2008; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984), is the equal -environments assumption (EEA). 
The EEA assumes that the contribution of shared -environmental influences does not differ 
between siblings for the trait under investigation. The main concern here is that if shared - 
environment influences were larger for one class of zygosity than another, for example MZ pairs 
vs. DZ pairs, and these differences were not accounted for in the model, the estimated genetic 
and environmental influences would be biased: in such a case, the size of genetic effects on the 
trait would be overestimated while the shared -environment effects would be underestimated. 
It is well -acknowledged that MZ twins are treated more similarly than fraternal siblings 
in a variety of ways. For example, as children MZ twins are more likely to share a bedroom and 
to be dressed alike. And as adults they tend to stay in closer contact with each other than do DZ 
twins (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1993; Loehlin & Nichols, 1976). Despite these 
unquestioned similarities in specific aspects of the environment, the critical issue concerning the 
EEA is whether these differences influence the trait under investigation, i.e. does sharing the 
same bedroom lead one to become more similar, for instance, in tendencies towards depression 
or on political attitudes? In short, evidence for increased environmental similarity in MZ pairs 
does not in and of itself invalidate the CTD. 
A number of methods have been used to test the EEA. For example, utilising the 
perceived zygosity design (Scan, 1968), studies have shown that children whose parents 
believed them to be dizygotic when in fact they were monozygotic remain as concordant as MZ 
twins raised by parents who believed they were monozygotic (Kendler et al., 1993). More 
recently, Visscher et al. (2006) reported an assumption -free method of estimating heritability 
using molecular data to obtain precise measures of genetic relatedness of sibling pairs (although 
siblings on average share 50% of their segregating genes, this varies over a small range for 
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individual siblings just as a gambler's outcomes deviate from the average expectation on any 
short-run trial). This variation in genetic similarity between siblings allows a direct estimate of 
heritability. For height this estimate closely followed that obtained from the CTD (Visscher et 
al., 2006), thus validating the method, at least with respect to work on height: future work 
utilising this method in psychological traits will be important. 
2.4.2 Generalisability: Twin/Singleton Differences 
The CTD has also been challenged with regards to the validity of generalising to the 
wider population from findings obtained in a twin population. The fundamental test of whether 
this assumption has been violated is to compare the trait scores of twins to their non -twin siblings 
who are matched for social background and family influences (while controlling for age and sex 
effects). Twins are known to differ from singletons on some traits (notably those relating to 
prenatal growth); however, systematic differences in personality and other social science 
phenotypes have not been reported (Evans, Gillespie, & Martin 2002), suggesting fmdings in 
twins can be informative outside of this population. 
2.4.3 C and D are confounded in the CTD 
If data is limited to twins reared together, shared -environment and dominant genetic 
effects are confounded and cannot be estimated within the same model: it is not possible to 
model A, C, D, and E with just the information available from MZ and DZ pairs reared together. 
The decision to fit an ACE or an ADE model typically adheres to the following heuristic. If rDZ 
> .5rMZ, an ACE model will usually fit better than an ADE model, on grounds that shared 
environments serve to make DZ pairs more similar (relative to MZ pairs) thus reflecting the DZ 
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correlation being greater than half of the MZ correlation, which would not be expected if only A 
and E were present. Conversely, if rDZ < .5rMZ, an ADE model will usually fit better than an 
ACE model, on grounds that if MZ twins are more than twice as similar than DZ pairs this is 
evidence for the presence of non -additive genetic effects: recall that non -additive effects require 
all of the relevant alleles to produce the effect, and this will occur on average in only 25% of DZ 
pairs (vs. 50% for additive effects), thus decreasing the DZ pair similarity. 
Removing the confounding of C and D in the CTD is possible using an extended twin and 
family design. In such a design, the additional information afforded by the use of data, for 
example, on parents of twins (Eaves, Last, Young, & Martin, 1978; Neale & Fulker, 1984) and 
offspring of twins (Nance & Corey, 1976), allows for formal estimation of both shared - 
environment and non -additive genetic effects. 
2.5 Summary 
In summary, powerful analytical frameworks exist that allow researchers to understand 
the respective genetic and environmental contributions to variance in observed complex traits, 
such as personality, intelligence, or social and political attitudes, which include (but are certainly 
not limited to) the classical twin design. Modern methods have allowed this decomposition of 
genetic and environmental influences to be extended to take into account multiple variables with 
the important outcome that it is now possible to understand the common genetic and 
environment effects that may underpin two apparently distinct traits. As has been noted, 
numerous challenges to the methods of behavioural genetics have been voiced in the literature; 
however, most of these criticisms have been rebutted; for example, assumption free estimates of 
heritability are now possible (e.g. Visscher et al., 2006), tests of violations of the equal 
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environment assumption have not revealed systematic violations (e.g. Kendler et al., 1993), and 
extended twin and family designs allow shared -environment and dominance genetic effects to be 
estimated (Eaves et al., 1978), thus removing a confound of the CTD. 
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Chapter 3: Political Conservatism within the Personality System Model 
3.1 Introduction 
The role of individual differences underlying stable variation in political orientation has a 
long history (Adorno, Frenkel -Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Eysenck, 1954). This line 
of research has grown in recent years, partly because of the finding that political attitudes contain 
a substantial heritable component (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Martin et al., 1986) and the 
hypothesis that some or all of this genetic effect may reflect differences in personality (Verhulst, 
Hatemi, & Martin, 2010). However, while personality has intuitive links to political orientation 
(Sniderman, 1975), research has largely failed to support such associations (Alford & Hibbing, 
2007; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Mehrabian, 1996; Trapnell, 1994). Here we use the 
"personality system" model (McCrae & Costa, 1999) in two studies designed to examine the 
possibility that personality affects political orientation via mediating characteristic adaptations - 
in this case moral values. We first briefly summarise previous research relating personality to 
political orientation. We then describe how this three -level personality system model links 
personality to political behaviour via moral values, before presenting two studies testing 
predictions from this model. 
3.1.1 Personality and Political Orientation: A Brief Overview 
Of the major dimensions of personality, openness has been most reliably associated with 
political orientation, with high levels of openness correlating around .3 with liberal political 
attitudes (Carney et al., 2008; McCrae, 1996; Trapnell, 1994; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004). 
Results for traits other than openness have been mixed. For instance, modest relationships have 
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been reported between conscientiousness and political orientation (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003; Mondak & Halperin, 2008), but other studies have found no association (e.g. Alford & 
Hibbing, 2007). Likewise, while some studies have reported modest effects of agreeableness, 
extraversion, and neuroticism on political orientation (e.g. Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, & 
Fraley, 2007), more studies have failed to fmd associations from these traits to political 
orientation (Alford & Hibbing, 2007; Carney et al., 2008; Mehrabian, 1996; Trapnell, 1994). 
This led some authors to argue that, with the exception of openness, personality is unrelated to 
political orientation (Alford & Hibbing, 2007; McCrae, 1996). 
3.1.2 Politics Within the Personality System Model 
Large individual differences are apparent in political behaviour even after controlling for 
factors such as social status, gender, and cognitive ability (Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, & Deary, 
2010). As such, while individual differences in traits such as personality may have significant 
effects on political behaviour, these may be complex or indirect in nature (Gerber, Huber, 
Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson, 2010). A 
model accounting for such complex or mediated effects linking personality to behaviour has 
been termed a "personality system framework" (McCrae & Costa, 1999). The personality system 
framework (see Figure 3.1) consists of three linked domains. At the most basic level (Level 1), 
lie largely biologically driven "basic tendencies" including personality. Level 2 consists of 
"characteristic adaptations" such as values. Constructs at this level are argued to be formed under 
the joint influence of basic tendencies and external factors such as life- events and cultural norms. 
Finally, at the third level of organization lies "objective biography" - behaviours emitted in 
interplay with external stimuli and characteristic adaptations. Importantly, this model implies 
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that the influence of basic tendencies (including personality traits) is often mediated by 
characteristic adaptations with no direct link from personality to behaviour. 






















While McCrae and Costa (1999) focused on the development and structure of 
personality, the model provides a coherent framework for translating personality traits into 
behaviours such as political orientation. For example, a person high on the basic tendency of 
empathy may come to value fairness (a characteristic adaptation). In translating this value into 
behaviour, contextual factors will play a role. This suggests that the behaviours under analysis 
should be specific to a particular context rather than aggregating across contexts. To give a 
concrete example, a single value such as fairness may be reflected in support for increased 
taxation of high earners in one context, and in support for merit -based pay in the context of 
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deciding individual compensation. We next turn to specifying and testing a set of characteristic 
adaptations that may mediate the effect of basic tendencies on political orientation. 
In developing a mediated model, a measurement model must be chosen for the mediating 
layer. While several powerful measures of values have been proposed, in particular the Schwartz 
(1992) model of values, here we focus on the two- factor model of morality posited by Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek (2009). We chose this model because of its focus on political behaviours 
(Graham et al., 2009), but the reasoning should be applicable to other values models. 
3.1.3 The Mediating Role of Moral Values 
Haidt and Graham (2007) recently suggested that moral behaviour varies according to 
five core foundations: harm (minimising harm to others), fairness (maximising fairness to all), 
in -group loyalty (the importance of the in- group), authority (respect for status and hierarchy), 
and purity (avoiding impure or disgusting acts /entities). These five facets of morality, in turn, 
correlate to form two higher -order moral factors of "individualizing" (the aggregate score on 
harm and fairness) and "binding" - the aggregate score on authority, in -group loyalty, and purity 
(Graham et al., 2009). Both individualizing and binding have been shown to account for 
significant variance in liberalism -conservatism in both the United States and UK (Graham et al., 
2009) and in The Netherlands (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). 
Several face valid links exist from personality to these moral values. Neuroticism, 
characterised by anxiety and threat -sensitivity (Costa & McCrae, 1992), has face -valid 
associations with both binding (to secure the group from threat) and individualizing (to protect 
individuals from coercion). Research supports the suggestion that enhanced response to threat 
predicts greater support for policies that protect social norms (Oxley et al., 2008). Agreeableness, 
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which indexes empathy and pro -social tendencies (Jensen -Campbell & Graziano, 2001), is 
conceptually linked to a preference for reduction of suffering and injustice, features that underpin 
individualizing. Openness has been consistently found to predict unconventionality (McCrae, 
1996). Thus we predicted a negative association between openness and binding (which reflects a 
preference for group conformity), as well as a positive association with individualizing reflecting 
the desire for maximum freedom of expression. Conscientiousness reflects responsible and 
dutiful behaviour and is associated with Protestant work ethic values (Christopher, Zabel, & 
Jones, 2008; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and as such is conceptually linked to binding, via the 
emphasis on group order. Finally, extraversion has shown links with right -wing authoritarianism 
(Ekehammer, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004), which indexes submissiveness, conformity, 
and aggressiveness to legitimised out -groups (Altemeyer, 1996), perhaps as a reflection of 
extraversion enhancing fitness by increasing social dominance (Nettle, 2005). As such, we 
predicted extraversion would associate positively with binding, which in turn taps authoritative, 
parochial values. 
3.1.4 Overview 
In summary, we hypothesised that previous links of political orientation to moral values 
reported recently in US, UK, and Dutch samples would be replicable in independent UK and US 
samples. Our critical predictions specified that each of the five personality domains would show 
significant effects on political orientation, mediated by moral values within a personality system 
framework. Next we use structural equation modelling in two independent studies to test 
hypotheses linking the five- factor model to binding and individualizing and politics. 
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3.2 Method - Study 1 
3.2.1 Participants 
Four hundred and forty-seven participants took part in Study 1 (315 female; mean age 
(female) = 19.27, SD = 2.65; mean age (male) = 20.12, SD = 3.94). Participants were 
undergraduate students who received partial course credit for their time. 
3.2.2 Procedure and Measures 
Moral values were assessed using the 32 -item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) 
measure of harm, fairness, in -group loyalty, authority, purity, with 2 validity -check items 
(Graham et al., 2011). Personality was assessed using the full 240-item NEO -PI -R providing 
measures of the five major domains of personality: agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Political 
orientation was assessed on a 7 -point Likert-scale measure asking "How would you describe 
your political orientation ?" and anchored at 0 with the label "Very liberal" through to 6 "Very 
conservative ". This single -item measure has been used widely in political psychology research 
and shown good reliability and predictive validity (Carney et al., 2008; Fuchs & Klingemann, 
1990; Jost, 2006). All measures were administered on -line via a web browser to facilitate data 
storage and scoring. 
3.3 Results - Study 1 
Descriptive statistics and reliability for the scales are shown in Table 3.1 and correlations 
between the scales in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics for personality, moral values, and political orientation in Study 1 
and Study 2. 
Measure 
Study 1 Study 2 
M SD M SD 
Moral Values 
Harm 3.52 0.72 5.05 0.85 
Fairness 3.68 0.65 4.64 0.97 
In -group 2.78 0.76 3.75 1.19 
Authority 2.84 0.80 3.73 1.06 
Purity 2.13 0.85 3.78 1.26 
Personality 
Agreeableness 47.59 8.33 9.93 2.18 
Conscientiousness 40.87 8.79 10.89 2.26 
Extraversion 53.72 7.61 7.65 3.23 
Neuroticism 57.97 8.91 6.74 2.70 
Openness 55.86 7.12 10.47 2.23 
Political Orientation 
2.40 1.33 3.43 1.02 
Table 3.2 Correlations among personality domains, moral values, and political orientation in 
Study 1. 
Measure Har Fa. In. Au. Pu. A C E NO 
m 
Fairness .64* 
In -group 31* .26* 
Authority .22* .17* .65* 
Purity .29* .15* .52* .55* 
A .38* .25* .00 -.02 .08 
C .08 .03 .00 .00 .04 .16 
E .15* .03 .15* .12 .07 .18* .13* 
N .14* .09 -.03 -.02 .07 -.07 -.44* -30* 
0 .16* .16* -.22* -.24* -.27* .13* .00 .31* .05 
Pol. -.11 -.25* .26* .26* 32* -.15* .08 .00 -.06 -.30* 
Note: Bolded correlations are significant at < .05, Asterisk ( *) signifies significance at the .01 
level (2- tailed). A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; N = Neuroticism; 
0 = Openness; Pol. = Political Orientation. 
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Structural models were built using AMOS 17.0 for Windows. Multiple fit indices were 
used; namely, the X2 test, the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root -mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). We handled measurement error in personality and moral values by 
treating each variable as a latent factor: personality was defined by a single indicator, the mean 
score of the relevant dimension, with the measurement error variance fixed as the difference 
between 1 and the reliability of the scale (calculated using Cronbach's alpha) times the scale 
variance (Hayduk, 1987). Moral values were defined by multiple indicators: the scales of in- 
group, authority, and purity, and the scales of harm and fairness, were utilised as indicators for 
binding and individualizing, respectively. Personality traits and moral values were allowed to 
correlate in each model. 
Three models were tested (although we acknowledge further theoretical models may be 
plausible as well): Model 1 (our predicted model) specified that personality influences moral 
values, which in turn influence political orientation. Model 2 reversed the roles of moral values 
and personality, specifying that moral values influence personality, which in turn influences 
political orientation. Finally, we tested a model in which personality influences political 
orientation, which in turn influences moral values (Model 3). 
Model 1, our theoretical model, described the data well without modification (RMSEA = 
.07, x2 = 99.17 (cif = 30, p <.001), CFI = .95). By comparison with Model 1, Models 2 and 3 
provided poorer fits to the data as judged by all of the fit indices: RMSEA = .10, X2 = 107.80 (df 
= 31, p <.001), CFI = .91 and RMSEA = .1242 = 226.48 (df = 32, p <.01), CFI = .85, 
respectively. 
We subsequently examined model 1 for potential improvements. The path from 
conscientiousness to binding was non -significant, and so was removed. Furthermore, 
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modification indices suggested that openness had a direct association with political orientation, 
and so this path was added. This final version described the data well (RMSEA = .07 X2 = 80.20 
(ci f= 24, p <.001), CFI = .95; see Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Path diagram illustrating the relationships between personality, moral values, and 
political orientation in Study 1. 
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As neuroticism loaded positively on both binding and individualizing, this effect was 
further analysed. To test whether different facets of neuroticism might be having different, 
perhaps even opposing effects on moral values, we built a model containing all of the 
neuroticism facets and then reduced the model down to only those facets that showed significant 
pathways to binding and/or individualizing. The final model fit the data well (RMSEA = .07, x2 
= 17.53 (df = 6, p < .01), CFI = .99) and included three facets: the facets anxiety and self - 
consciousness loaded positively on individualizing (ß = .14 and .17, respectively), while 
depression loaded negatively on individualizing (ß = -.16). 
3.4 Brief Discussion - Study 1 
As predicted, openness, neuroticism, and agreeableness were significant predictors of 
individualizing, with binding being associated with openness, neuroticism, and extraversion. We 
also observed a direct relationship between openness and political orientation. Finally, as 
predicted, binding and individualizing accounted for significant variance in political orientation. 
Contrary to prediction, the association between conscientiousness and binding did not reach 
significance. 
These results broadly support the initial hypotheses, demonstrating a relationship 
between moral values and political orientation, and also relating personality to moral values, and 
via mediated pathways, to political orientation. In order to increase our confidence in the 
findings we next sought to replicate and extend the findings in an independent non -student 
sample utilising a broader measure of political orientation. This study is presented below. 
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3.5 Method - Study 2 
3.5.1 Participants 
Four hundred and seventy -six participants took part in Study 2 (307 female; mean age 
(female) = 33.69, SD = 12.33; mean age (male) = 31.65, SD = 10.95). Participants in this sample 
were recruited from a web -based recruitment site, Amazon's `Mechanical Turk', or Mturk, a 
website that allows people (aged 18 or over) to perform short tasks for small sums of money: 
data from this sample has been reported elsewhere (Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2010). The 
survey was restricted to residents of the United States. This site has generated results comparable 
to other samples (e.g. DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). The sample contained 81% European 
Americans, 5% African Americans, 5% Asian Americans, 4% Latino Americans, and 5% other. 
3.5.2 Procedure and Measures 
Each participant rated their support/opposition on a 7 -point Likert scale to 14 items 
addressing current political issues. These items included restrictions against Internet 
pornography, comprehensive sex education in public schools, banning abortion and legalised gay 
marriage, allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States, higher taxes for the 
wealthy, aggressive military response to dangerous foreign groups, unemployment payments, 
gun control laws, offshore drilling, and subsidised healthcare for the poor. These items summed 
had a Cronbach's alpha of .82 and were subsequently utilised as a single scale indexing political 
orientation (higher scores represented greater conservatism). 
Participants also completed the moral relevance items from Graham et al. (2009), which 
are similar to the MFQ scales used in Study 1 and are designed to measure the same five moral 
dimensions of harm, fairness, in -group loyalty, authority, and purity. Personality was measured 
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with a short Big Five personality inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007), with each of the Big Five 
dimensions indexed by two items. 
3.6 Results - Study 2 
Descriptive statistics and reliability for the scales are shown in Table 3.1 and correlations 
between the scales in Table 3.3. 




Fa. In. Au. Pu. A C E N O 
Fairness .62* 
In -group 33* .47* 
Authority 38* .47* .68* 
Purity 33* 38* .52* .54* 
A .17* .15* .01 .03 .17* 
C -.01 .04 .09 .11 .15* .18* 
E .04 .08 .10 .09 .04 .04 .10 
N .09 .09 .10 .04 .06 -.26* -.20* -.21* 
0 .08 .15* .01 .05 -08. .18* .10 30* -21* 
Pol. .07 -.12 .17* .21* 34* -.06 .18* .12 .08 -.15* 
Note: Bolded correlations are significant at < .05, Asterisk ( *) signifies significance at the .01 
level (2- tailed). A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; N = Neuroticism; 
0 = Openness; Pol. = Political Orientation. 
We next attempted to confirm the final model of Study 1. Moral values were modelled as 
latent factors and were defined by multiple indicators. The scales of in- group, authority, and 
purity, and the scales of harm and fairness, were utilized as indicators for binding and 
individualizing, respectively. Personality traits and political orientation were modelled as 
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manifest variables. Personality traits were allowed to correlate in line with significant covariance 
observed in the correlation matrix. Model 1 again provided an adequate description of the data 
(RMSEA = .07, 
X2 = 98.06 (df= 30, p <.001), CFI = .94). Models 2 and 3 provided poorer fits to 
the data as judged by all of the fit indices: RMSEA = .10, x2 = 131.49 (df= 24, p <.001), CFI = 
.91 and RMSEA = .07,X2 = 110.65 (df= 32, p <.01), CFI = .93, respectively. 
We subsequently examined model 1 for potential improvements. Observations of the path 
coefficients suggested that in this sample openness did not affect binding. Additionally, we 
observed that openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness contained a significant direct path 
to political orientation. In a second step we adjusted for these paths, which led to a model 
demonstrating a good fit to the data (RMSEA = .06, X2 = 81.87 (df = 28, p < .001), CFI = .95; see 
Figure 3.3). 
3.7 Brief Discussion - Study 2 
Confirming the findings of Study 1, openness, neuroticism, and agreeableness were 
significant predictors of individualizing, with binding being associated with conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and extraversion: conscientiousness was not a significant predictor of binding in 
Study I, but was predicted to show links with this moral value. As in Study 1, openness directly 
influenced political orientation; however, in contrast to Study 1, here we observed additional 
direct paths from agreeableness and conscientiousness to political orientation. Finally, binding 
and individualizing, as in Study 1, accounted for significant variance in political orientation. 
These results broadly support the initial hypotheses and the results of Study 1, demonstrating 
a 
relationship between moral values and political orientation, and illuminating links from 
personality to moral values and, via mediated pathways, to political orientation. 
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Figure 3.3 Path diagram illustrating the relationships between personality, moral values, and 











3.8 General Discussion 
The central aim of these two studies was to test a personality system model of the 
relationship between personality, moral values, and political orientation. The core hypothesis 
was that interposing an appropriate measure of characteristic adaptations in the form of moral 
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values would reveal links of personality to political orientation. This hypothesis was confirmed 
in two independent studies, supporting a personality system model (McCrae & Costa, 1999) of 
political orientation. 
High individualizing is characterised by a concern for fairness and ensuring that 
individuals are protected from harm. This value was significantly associated with agreeableness, 
neuroticism, and openness. High binding is characterised by a valuing of order, authority, in- 
group loyalty, and aspirations to a pure life, and was associated with extraversion and low 
openness (in Study 1 and 2), and with conscientiousness (Study 2). These two moral values in 
turn combined to predict political orientation. A conservative orientation in this model was 
associated with high valuing of order and hierarchy combined with a low value on the treatment 
of individuals, while a liberal or left -orientation was associated with low valuing of the group 
and strong emphasis on equity and avoidance of harm. Moving in from the extremes the model 
revealed how simple left-right distinctions are articulated into a more complex political 
landscape in the personality system framework. The model allows for quite distinct 
characteristics among groups with similar political orientations. Contrast, for example, two 
individuals with moderate left -of- centre orientations. One may value group solidarity strongly, 
but have little concern for individual liberties. The other may value both the individual and the 
group to an equal but moderate extent. Such individuals would, we suggest, self -report an 
identical orientation on the liberal -conservative dimension, but would disagree strongly over 
particular policies: for instance, immigration and free trade (where those high on group loyalty 
might favour trade barriers and protection) and civil liberties (where concerns for the treatment 
of individuals would be relevant). Thus the model allows far more sophisticated and precise 
political behavioural predictions than can be made from a simple unitary left-right spectrum. 
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A further important observation from the results concerns the significant influence of 
neuroticism upon both individualizing and binding. Higher levels of neuroticism predict higher 
levels of both these values, but individualizing and binding influence political orientation in 
opposite directions. As such, it is likely that failures to associate neuroticism with political 
orientation in previous research may be due to these influences effectively cancelling out at the 
level of political orientation. We observed additional countervailing effects at the facet -level: 
scores on anxiety and self -consciousness both increase individualizing, while depression scores 
relate negatively to this value. This latter finding suggests that future work attempting to link 
neuroticism with political attitudes would be wise to consider facet -level associations alongside 
the more common domain -level relations. 
Although our predictions were broadly validated across studies, some differences were 
observed between Study 1 and Study 2. In Study 1 links from conscientiousness were non- 
significant while in Study 2 conscientiousness showed significant links to binding and a direct 
link to political orientation. Possible explanations may include a lack of power, but also possible 
increasing effects of conscientiousness with age and accompanying changes in responsibilities 
and life -roles (mean age in Study 2 was 32 years vs. 20 years in Study 1). Additionally, while the 
association of openness to both individualizing and political orientation were robust, we failed to 
replicate the association between openness and binding in Study 2. This may reflect a loss of 
bandwidth (coverage of the breadth of behaviours) in the ten -item inventory (two items per Big 
Five dimension) used in Study 2. This interpretation seems plausible given that low openness has 
shown robust links to traits with prima facie links to binding, such as right -wing authoritarianism 
(Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Future work is nevertheless recommended to confirm the stability of 
this association between openness and binding. Finally, the strength of the relationships between 
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personality traits and moral values was notably lower in Study 2 (specifically, the links from 
openness and extraversion to binding, and from agreeableness to individualizing). Again, this 
may have arisen because of limitations in coverage of the short- measure personality instrument 
and further work is recommended to clarify the magnitude of these associations. 
A number of opportunities for future research emerge from these findings. Firstly, 
exploration of additional intermediary constructs by which personality exerts effects on political 
behaviours may be valuable. Candidates include values constructs such as those proposed by 
Schwartz (1992) and cultural- ideological measures explored by Ashton and colleagues (Ashton 
et al., 2005). In addition, traits with links both to personality and to political orientation (Sibley 
& Duckitt, 2008), such as social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994) and right -wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996), may also help to further articulate the 
relationship between personality and political attitudes. 
Secondly, further insight into the origins of political attitudes may flow from examination 
of the dynamic components of the personality systems model. For example, while emotionality is 
posited as exerting a chronic influence on binding, this value is likely to increase in importance 
when the individual feels threatened (e.g. Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a). 
Accordingly, experimental manipulations that address these putative dynamic or acute effects 
may increase understanding of influences on political behaviour. 
In summary, the studies reported here suggest that the personality system model is a 
useful framework for understanding the complex relationship between personality and political 
orientation. The data suggest that personality traits play a significant role in shaping political 
orientation, but do so largely indirectly, via an intermediary layer of characteristic adaptations. 
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This model may be productive for further understanding individual differences in political 
behaviour. 
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Chapter 4 - Genetic Bases of In -group Favouritism: 
Evidence for Common and Specific Biological Mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction 
In -group favouritism is ubiquitous in human societies (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2006; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sumner, 1907). As Fiske (2002) notes, "people typically seek 
other people who are similar to themselves, being comfortable with others they perceive as 
members of their own in- group. From comfort follows, at best, neglect of people from out- groups 
and, at worst, murderous hostility toward out -groups perceived as threatening the in- group" (p. 
123). Competition for resources exacerbates in -group favouritism (Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 
1956). Indeed, in the classic Robbers' Cave study, Sherif and colleagues (Sherif, 1966) exposed 
boys assigned to one of two groups at a summer camp to intergroup competition: hostilities were 
observed within days such that the experiment was necessarily halted. However, favouritism 
continues to exist even in the absence of such competition (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1982; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008) and extends to arbitrary 
affiliations (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008); individuals who are 
assigned to a group on grounds as trivial as preferences within a set of paintings are more likely 
to distribute financial resources to other in -group members than to out -group individuals (e.g. 
Tajfel et al., 1971). Such observations, coupled with the survival and reproductive benefits of 
group membership (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) - groups are better equipped to repel outside 
attacks, can hunt more efficiently, and provide greater mating opportunities - suggest that 
mechanisms fostering alignment with the in -group are likely to have been subject to positive 
selection in humans (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). 
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If the selective benefits of in -group favouritism have been high while the cues for 
affiliation have been arbitrary (rather than limited to a small set of essentialist types), selection 
could have favoured the development of a flexible central affiliation mechanism (CAM) that has 
access to the full range of perceptual information signifying group membership (Kurzban, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Rand et al., 2009). If such a central mechanism underlies human in- 
group favouritism, then the drive to prefer own -group members may be high, and the chosen in- 
group will be relatively arbitrarily assembled on the basis of context and will be updatable over 
time. By contrast, a strong -specificity hypothesis suggesting that affiliation is based on a set of 
essentialist features, such as kinship, ethnicity, or shared beliefs, predicts that favouritism will be 
uncorrelated across domains, relatively hard to form from arbitrary cues, and relatively invariant 
to context (Gil- White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996). 
Although previous research has tended to favour either a CAM or an essentialist model of 
favouritism, it is also plausible that both a flexible CAM system and a set of essentialist 
mechanisms have evolved in humans. Research suggests that group affiliation is relatively 
flexible for at least some features: Rand et al. (2009), observed that while in -group favouritism 
was present in voters during the 2008 Democratic primary season (Hilary Clinton vs. Barack 
Obama), this bias against Obama was absent in Clinton supporters once she had conceded, 
suggesting that (at least) this form of in -group identity may be flexible. However, certain types 
of groupings appear to robustly retain special salience: Gil -White (2001; see also Hirschfeld, 
1996) notes from research with Mongol semi -nomadic pastoralists that humans understand 
ethnic groups as if they were "species ", with essential, immutable properties. Therefore, we 
predicted that a mixed model containing both a flexible CAM mechanism and specialized 
essentialist mechanisms would best explain human in -group favouritism. 
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We tested these contrasting mechanisms using measures of in -group favouritism across 
three important social groupings -religion, ethnicity, and race. Favouritism according to these 
groupings was assessed in a large, genetically informative, and population -representative twin 
sample and analysed using multiple -group multivariate structural modelling. The three 
theoretical models make clear predictions about behaviour and, in particular, about the patterns 
of correlation that should be observed between different types of favouritism. Multivariate 
behaviour genetics research designs allowed us to discriminate among these theories through the 
predicted patterns of genetic and environmental influences on in -group favouritism. In particular, 
the common -pathway model was developed by Kendler, Heath, Martin, and Eaves (1987) as a 
powerful statistical tool precisely to distinguish among these types of competing theories (i.e., 
those with a common underlying mechanism for a given set of traits vs. those with a unique 
mechanism specific to each trait); in the research reported here, we applied the common -pathway 
model to in -group favouritism. 
If a common brain or mental system underlies multiple behaviours (as is predicted by the 
CAM model of in -group favouritism), then environmental and genetic effects on these diverse 
behaviours must be mediated by this central (or common) pathway, as shown in the upper 
portion of Figure 3.1. However, if each behavioural domain reflects the operation of distinct, 
essentialist brain or mental systems, then each of these behaviours will result from its own 
unique genetic (A), shared -environment (or familial -environment; C), and unique environment 
(E) effects (see the lower portion of Fig. 1). Finally, if the brain or mental systems underlying 
favouritism involve both a common flexible system and additional distinct, essentialist 
mechanisms, then a mixed model (i.e., one encompassing both parts of Fig. 1) would be required 
to explain the observed pattern of behaviour. 
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Figure 4.1 Predictions from the central affiliation mechanism (CAM) and essentialist theories of 




















Note: As illustrated in the upper portion of the figure, if there is a single neural or mental 
mechanism for affiliation across multiple behavioural domains, this would constrain genetic (A) 
and environmental (C, shared environment, and E, unique environment) influences on 
favouritism to be mediated through the CAM factor. However, as illustrated in the lower portion 
of the figure, if there are distinct, essentialist mechanisms (i.e., if each essential group -formation 
domain has its own evolved mechanism), different kinds of favouritism would have different sets 
of genetic and environmental influences. 
We tested these competing theories of in -group favouritism by comparing three models: 
Model 1, the CAM model; Model 2, the essentialist model; and Model 3, the mixed Central 
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Affiliation Mechanism model. Model 1 assumes that favouritism is not based on essentialist 
systems and allowed us to test the prediction that genetic and environmental effects operating 
solely via a single common favouritism factor fit the data well. Model 2 allowed us to test the 
prediction that only specific influences operating on each favouritism trait are required for the 
model to achieve a good fit to the data, and that there is no need for a common favouritism 
factor. Model 3, the full common -pathway model, allowed us to test the prediction that both a 
general favouritism mechanism and additional specific (essentialist) effects are required to 
provide an adequate fit to the data. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Phenotypic data were available for 957 pairs of twins contacted by the MacArthur Foundation 
Survey of Midlife Development (MIDUS) in the United States (Kendler, Thornton, Gilman, & 
Kessler, 2000; Kessler, Gilman, Thornton, & Kendler, 2004). These data were collected on 
working -age (25 -74) adults to examine the factors pertaining to midlife development in the 
domains of mental and physical health, and psycho -social wellbeing, among others. Twin pairs 
were recruited through telephone calls and asking respondents whether they, or any of their 
immediate family, were members of an intact twin pair. A representative sample of the United 
States of approximately 50,000 households was screened in this manner. If respondents reported 
the presence of a twin in the family (c. 15 %), permission was requested to contact them again for 
further participation in the survey. Sixty percent of applicable respondents agreed and were thus 
referred to the MIDUS recruitment process. Further information on the sample is available in 
Brim et al. (1995- 1996). 
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The pairs of twins were assessed for religious, ethnic, and racial in -group favouritism, 
among other behaviours. Of the monozygotic (MZ) pairs, 167 were male (mean age = 44.6 years, 
SD =11.4) and 194 were female (mean age = 43.7 years, SD = 12.2). Of the dizygotic (DZ) 
pairs, 136 were male (mean age = 44.6 years, SD = 12.4), 210 were female (mean age = 45.8 
years, SD = 12.6), and 250 were opposite -sex pairs (mean age = 45.9 years, SD = 11.8). The 
excess of females over males is comparable to previous twin research (Lykken, McGue, & 
Tellegen, 1987). 
4.2.2 Measures of In -group Favouritism 
For each group type, we assessed three distinct elements of in -group favouritism: (a) 
strength of identification with the group, (b) preference for affiliating with in -group members, 
and (c) the importance placed on marrying within the group. For instance, religious in -group 
favouritism was assessed with the following items: "How closely do you identify with being a 
member of your religious group ? "; "How much do you prefer to be with other people who are 
the same religion as you ? "; and "How important do you think it is for people of your religion to 
marry other people who are the same religion ? ". The items for ethnic and racial in -group 
favouritism had the same wording as the items for religious in -group favouritism, except that the 
appropriate group type was substituted (e.g., "How closely do you identify with being a member 
of your racial group?"; also see Appendix A). All responses were made on 4 -point Likert scales 
(from 1, very, to 4, not at all). Interitem correlations were high within each group type (ranging 
from .32 to .65, with all but one correlation greater than .40), and scale scores were calculated as 
the sum of item scores within a group type. Phenotypic correlations (from one individual in a 
given pair taken at random) between the three scales ranged from .31 to .38. 
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4.2.3 Analysis 
Prior to conducting the analyses, we controlled for the effects of age and sex, and 
standardised residuals were used in subsequent analyses (McGue & Bouchard, 1984). A classical 
twin design was used. We used structural equation modelling to model the covariance of MZ 
twins in terms of additive genetic effects, shared -environment effects, and unique -environment 
effects. These models were estimated by full- information maximum -likelihood analysis using 
OpenMx (Boker et al., 2O1Oa; Boker et al., 2O1Ob). 
4.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for each trait are presented in Table 4.1. Intra -class correlations 
indicated that MZ twins were significantly more similar to each other than were DZ twins for all 
three types of in -group favouritism, a pattern suggesting a genetic influence (see Figure 4.2). For 
ethnic in -group favouritism, MZ correlations were more than twice the DZ correlations, 
suggesting nonadditive genetic variance. However, because of the clear theoretical importance of 
the shared environment for all three types of in -group favouritism, we tested models 
incorporating additive genetic and shared- and unique- environment influences (the classical ACE 
model) for each type rather than modelling genetic dominance effects. The full results of the 
univariate modeling for each trait are presented in Table 4.2. In each case, additive genetic and 
unique -environmental influences were statistically significant. Shared -environment had 
significant effects on religious in -group favouritism (Ax (1) = 3.70, p = .05), but these shared 
family effects were not significant for ethnic and race in -group favouritism, and could be 
dropped without a significant decrease in goodness -of -fit (Ax (1) = 0, p = 1.0; Axe (1) = 0, p = 
1.0, respectively). 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for religious, ethnic, and race favouritism across zygosity 
Mean MZm mean MZf mean DZm mean DZf mean DZos mean 
Relig. 2.51 (.90) 2.69 (.91) 2.40 (.90) 2.56 (.91) 2.51 (.83) 2.47 (.93) 
Ethn. 2.98 (.81) 2.95 (.79) 3.01 (.83) 3.11 (.76) 2.82 (.84) 3.02 (.80) 
Race 2.07 (.80) 2.03 (.77) 2.07 (.83) 2.17 (.87) 1.97 (.75) 2.11 (.79) 
Note: Relig. = religious favouritism; Ethn. = ethnic favouritism; Race = race favouritism; 
standard deviations are in parentheses; MZm = MZ males; MZf = MZ females; DZm = DZ 
males; DZf = DZ females; DZos = DZ opposite sex 
Table 4.2 Standardised univariate heritability estimates for religious, ethnic, and race in -group 
favouritism items with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
A C E 
Religious Favouritism .41 .17 .42 
(.20 - .61) (.00 - .33) (.37 - .50) 
Ethnic Favouritism .47 .00 .53 
(.23 - .58) (.00 - .19) (.45 - .62) 
Race Favouritism .39 .00 .61 
(.18 - .48) (.00 - .16) (.54 - .71) 
Note: A = additive genetic effects; C = shared -environment effects; E = unique- environment 
effects 
We next moved to our core tests: whether the CAM model, the essential model, or 
the 
mixed model provides a better fit to the data. The three theoretical models were compared 
with a 
standard baseline model - the Cholesky ACE decomposition incorporating all three 
favouritism 
traits (for fit statistics and comparison statistics for all models, see Table 4.3: Note 
that there was 
no significant difference between the phenotypic saturated model (estimating 
phenotypic means 
and variances and covariances across twin order and zygosity) and the Cholesky; 
Axe (33) = 
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35.6, p = .35). The prediction that a CAM factor alone provides an adequate explanation of 
favouritism (Model 1) was tested first. This model, which includes a common -pathway 
mechanism but no genetic pathways specific to any domain of in -group favouritism, fit 
significantly worse than the baseline model, Axe (6) = 38.89, p < .01. Thus, contrary to the CAM 
only theory, essentialist pathways are required to explain favouritism. 
Next, we tested whether essentialist factors alone are sufficient to model in -group 
favouritism (Model 2). This model, lacking a CAM (common additive genetic, shared -, and 
unique- environment effects were constrained to zero), also fit significantly worse than the 
baseline model, Axe (6) = 845.68, p < .01. Thus, contrary to the essentialist -only theory, a 
common or context -sensitive system is required to explain favouritism. Finally, Model 3 (the 
mixed model) was tested. This model posited both a CAM system and essentialist factors, 
including correlated unique- environment pathways at the essentialist level. This model fit the 
data with no significant decrement from the fit of the baseline model, Axe (1) = 0.60, p = .44. 
This finding strongly supports the idea that both the CAM and essentialist genetic effects are 
required to explain variation in favouritism. We conducted chi -square comparisons as a rigorous 
and direct test of Model 3 against nested Models 1 and 2. These comparisons indicated that both 
Model 1, Axe (3) = 21.65, p < .01, and Model 2, Axe (3) = 222.49, p < .01, showed a significant 
loss of fit compared with Model 3, our preferred model. This indicated again that both the CAM 
and essentialist genetic effects are required to explain variation in favouritism. We then 
examined whether Model 3 could be further simplified without significant loss of fit. No genetic 
paths could be removed without significantly worsening fit. A marginal exception was the 
essentialist genetic path to religious favouritism. Dropping this path (Model 3a) did not cause a 
nominally significant decrease in fit, Axe (1) = 3.60, p = .058; however, the model demonstrated 
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an inferior fit relative to Model 3 according to Akaike's information criterion (AIC; AIC 
increased to 3,338.42 from 3,336.82), and this path was therefore retained. 
Figure 4.2 Intra -class correlations for three types of in -group favouritism (religious, ethnic, and 













Exploring the role of environments on favouritism, we examined the significance of the 
shared- and unique- environment effects. It was possible to drop all shared -environment paths 
without significant loss of fit (Model 3b), Ax2 (4) = 3.47, p = .48. In a final step, we examined 
unique- environment influences. This step revealed that there were no significant effects from the 
common unique- environment influence on racial in -group favouritism, nor from the specific 
unique -environment influence on ethnic in -group favouritism: in Model 3c, the common unique - 
environment path was removed, Axe (1) = 2.73, p = .10, and in Model 3d, the specific unique - 




Table 4.3 Fit statistics and comparison statistics for all models. 
Model Parameters 
Fit Statistics Nested Model Comparisons 
-2LL AIC Reference Axe Adf 
Model 
p 
Baseline 21 12968.22 3340.22 - _ 
1 15 13007.11 3365.11 Baseline 38.89 6 < 
.01 
2 15 13813.90 4171.90 Baseline 845.68 6 < 
.01 
3 20 12968.82 3336.82 Baseline 0.60 1 .44 
3a 19 12972.42 3338.42 3 3.60 1 .058 
3b 16 12972.29 3332.27 3 3.47 4 .48 
3c 15 12975.02 3333.02 3b 2.73 1 .10 
3d 14 12975.06 3331.06 3c 0.04 1 .84 
Note: Model 1 models the common affiliation mechanism, Model 2 is an essentialist model, and 
Model 3 is the mixed model. Model 3a excludes the essentialist genetic path to religious 
favouritism, Model 3b excludes all shared -environment paths, Model 3c excludes the common 
unique- environment path (to racial in -group favouritism), and Model 3d excludes the specific 
unique -environment path (to racial in -group favouritism). 
Axe 
is the change in -2 log likelihood 
( -2LL), and Ad/ is the change in the degrees of freedom, relative to the reference model. AIC = 
Akaike's information criterion. 
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Figure 4.3 Final model (Model 3d) of the genetic and environmental influences on in -group 
favouritism in three domains. 
.70 .72 
(.62 .75) \p( (.66.78) 
Central Affiliation Mechanism 
(CAM) 
.59 .83 
(.51 .67) (.75 .91) 
Religious Favoritism 
.63 .49 -.38 .41 






Note: All paths shown here are significant, and their coefficients are indicated. Variables with no 
connecting pathway were modelled as independent. The 95% confidence intervals are given in 
parentheses. A = genetic influences; E = unique environment influences. 
4.4 Discussion 
This study is the first, to our knowledge, to provide genetic evidence that in -group 
favouritism, at least at the level of religion, ethnicity, and race, is underpinned by both a central 
affiliation mechanism (CAM) and essentialist favouritism systems, each with significant genetic 
and environmental components. These results are compatible with recent behavioural research 
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and game- theoretic modelling (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006) and 
suggest that human in -group favouritism is best understood in terms of a multicomponent 
architecture supporting both essentialist domains (Gil- White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996) and a 
flexible CAM supporting dynamic group affiliation (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). With 
regard to the relative influences of the CAM system and the essentialist systems on each of the 
favouritism traits, squaring the standardized factor loadings demonstrates that the CAM accounts 
for 35 %, 69 %, and 21% of variation in religious, ethnic, and racial favouritism, respectively. 
These data indicate that the CAM only partially mediates religious, ethnic, and racial 
favouritism, and that substantial influences on favouritism also occur at the essentialist- system 
level. 
Our results indicated that the shared -environment does not exert significant influences on 
favouritism. Although our choice of final model reflected the most parsimonious interpretation 
of the data, our study was not sufficiently powered to detect small shared -environment effects. 
Further research is recommended to address this potentially important, albeit likely modest, 
source of variation in in -group favouritism. Conversely, although our final model contained an 
essentialist genetic influence on religious favouritism, removing this path only marginally 
worsened the model's fit to the data. Therefore, further research is recommended to clarify 
whether the genetic influences on religious in -group favouritism are wholly mediated through the 
CAM or act in tandem with it. 
Perhaps the most interesting environmental effect was that elements of the unique - 
environment acting at the essentialist level exerted countervailing effects, such that elevated 
levels of religious favouritism were associated with lowered levels of ethnic favouritism. This 
may reflect the influence of religious teachings, which may increase ethnic tolerance, or the 
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possibility that religion became superordinate to coalitions based on ethnicity. Recent work 
supports the existence of these countervailing effects of religious belief. For example, Malka, 
Soto, Cohen, & Miller (2011) report that religious belief promotes both a culturally based 
conservative identity, in turn decreasing support for social welfare provision, but also promotes a 
prosocial value orientation, which in turn increases support for social welfare provision. Malka 
and Soto (2011) provide further evidence for such countervailing effects of religious belief, 
observing that religiosity has "both a direct effect toward opposition to torture and an indirect 
effect -via conservative political alignment- toward support of torture" (p. 1091). 
What might be the psychological basis for the CAM? One possibility is that the CAM 
reflects right -wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981): RWA has been linked to both 
religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and to ethnocentrism (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008), and contains heritable variance (McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & 
Keyes, 1999), suggesting that RWA is a plausible candidate explanator for the CAM. Future 
work is recommended to assess the important issue of whether common genetic variation 
underlies both generalised favouritism and authoritarianism. 
Perhaps as an alternative to essentialist models, social dominance orientation (SDO; 
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) may account for specific genetic effects on either 
race and ethnic favouritism: SDO has been, independently of RWA, associated with 
ethnocentrism (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), but is not typically found to relate to religious 
fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 1998; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002), suggesting that SDO is not 
likely to account for variation in the CAM, although is a plausible candidate for understanding 
the specific effects on race and ethnic favouritism. Future work addressing this issue is also 
recommended. 
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Although the three group types studied here tap commonly studied and relevant bases of 
in -group favouritism, future research could fruitfully be extended to additional domains - for 
instance, loyalty to military, political, and sports coalitions; employer and workplace affiliation; 
and detailed close -kin affiliations. Cross -cultural studies would also be useful to determine the 
extent to which our results generalize across societies. Such research could further understanding 
of the extent to which the reported common factor influences the full range of in -group 
favouritism behaviours and could reveal whether favouritism in other group domains reflects the 
specialized systems in our final model or additional specialized systems. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence that in -group favouritism possesses both a 
common affiliation mechanism and additional, specific affiliation mechanisms, each with a 
distinct genetic architecture and distinct responses to unique environments. These findings have 
significant implications for theories addressing the evolution of, and the mechanisms 
underpinning, human group behaviour. 
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Chapter 5 - Genetic Architecture of Prosocial Obligations 
5.1 Introduction 
Prosocial behaviour is basic to successful social living (Staub, 1979), a contention 
supported by the centrality of prosocial attitudes and behaviour to the well -being of communities 
(Helliwell & Putnam, 2004; Keyes, 1998). Early work investigating the aetiology of prosociality 
argued that such behavior lacked stability both temporally and domain -wise (Gergen, Gergen, & 
Meter, 1972; Hartshorne & May, 1928; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). While this 
situationist perspective dominated the field for some decades (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 
1981), more recent research has demonstrated significant positive correlations between broad 
constellations of prosocial actions (Carlo & Randall, 2002; Eisenberg et al., 2002), supporting 
the existence of a stable prosocial personality. As noted by Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & 
Penner (2006): "IT _I here is a convergence offindings...that lead us to conclude that...there is 
such a thing as a prosocial personality', and...differences in this personality attribute are 
associated with differences in prosocial actions that range from willingness to help a distressed 
individual, to heroic rescues of people whose lives were in danger, to willingness to serve as a 
volunteer" (p. 265). 
A range of information supports the trait -like nature of prosociality. Factor analytic work 
by Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, and Speer (1991) demonstrated two major factors 
underpinning prosociality; however, only one of these factors related to helping others when 
escape from a request to help was easy (i.e. `true' prosociality; the second factor related 
to 
helping so as to alleviate ones own personal distress). Developmental studies 
have revealed that 
empathic responses and helping behaviours are seen in young children and even 
in infants 
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(Preston & de Waal, 2002; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) are suggestive of an innate capacity 
for prosociality. Finally, behavioural genetic studies have shown heritable components for both 
empathy (Matthews, Batson, Horn, & Rosenman, 1981; Zahn -Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 
1992), and prosociality (Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001; Rushton, 2004; Rushton, Fulker, 
Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1986; but see Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001), with evidence for 
cross -culture generality in these effects (Hur & Rushton, 2007). 
While these results strongly indicate the presence of a stable prosocial trait disposition 
with an underlying biology, existing genetically informative studies have been limited to what 
might be termed "inter- personal" or dyadic prosociality (e.g. "I have helped carry a stranger's 
belongings (books, parcels, etc .) "; Rushton, 2004; Rushton et al., 1986). While inter -personal 
prosociality is certainly important, it is clear that many of the most important domains of 
prosociality, such as civic obligations, obligations in work (Rossi, 2004), and redistribution of 
wealth/welfare obligation (Gurven, 2004), have not previously been addressed in a genetically 
informative study. In particular, it is unclear whether these specific prosocial obligations are, 
firstly, individually heritable, and, secondly, are underpinned by a single, genetically- influenced, 
mental faculty (Knafo, Zahn -Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008). 
To address these issues, here, we report a twin study examining the genetic and 
environmental structure of self -reported prosocial behavior across three important social 
domains: the concern for the social welfare of others, civic dutifulness, and the level of 
commitment to employment/work. Based on previous work indicating significant phenotypic 
associations of prosocial behaviours across domains, we predicted that a common latent factor 
with significant genetic effects would affect behaviour on all three prosocial traits. These 
predictions were also driven by previous research indicating the existence of such genetic effects 
92 
on components of prosocial behavior (Rushton, 2004; Rushton et al., 1986), and because of the 
consistent evidence that humans are instinctively prepared to engage in large -scale cooperative 
endeavours (Boyd & Richerson, 2006), with this behaviour evident even in early childhood 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), suggesting an innate predisposition for prosociality in humans. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Phenotypic data were available for 958 pairs of twins contacted by the MacArthur 
Foundation Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (Kendler, Thornton, Gilman, & 
Kessler, 2000; see Chapter 4 for more details of the sample and collection process). Of the 
monozygotic (MZ) pairs 167 were male (mean age = 44.64, SD = 11.32) and 194 were female 
(mean age = 43.69, SD = 12.20). Of the dizygotic (DZ) pairs 136 were male (mean age = 44.64, 
SD = 12.42), 210 were female (mean age = 45.78, SD = 12.61), and 251 were opposite -sex pairs 
(mean age = 45.86, SD = 11.73). The excess of females over males is comparable to previous 
twin research (Lykken, McGue, & Tellegen, 1987). 
5.2.2 Prosocial Obligations Measures 
Participants completed three scales measuring different forms of prosocial obligations: 
civic obligation (four items), work obligation (three items), and welfare obligation (three items) 
(Rossi, 2004), with a response scale from 0 -10. An example item assessing civic obligation was: 
"How much obligation would you feel to testify in court about an accident you witnessed ? "; 
for 
work obligation: "How much obligation would you feel to do more than most people 
would do on 
your kind of job ? "; and for welfare obligation: "How much obligation would you 
feel to pay more 
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for your health care so that everyone had access to health care ?" (also see Appendix B). 
Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 195 1) for the three prosocial domains was acceptable (Civic: 0.78; 
Work: 0.71; Welfare: 0.81). For the purpose of examining an omnibus univariate model, the 
three prosocial obligations scales were summed to form a composite prosocial obligations 
measure. Prior to analysis, the effects of age and sex were regressed out, and standardised 
residuals were used in subsequent analyses (McGue & Bouchard, 1984). 
5.2.3 Analysis 
All analyses utilised full- information maximum likelihood modelling, and structural 
equation modelling was conducted using OpenMx (Boker et al., 2010a; 2010b) and R (R 
Development Core Team, 2009). The modelling used to test our predictions is outlined 
graphically in Figure 5.1. The prediction of heritable and/or environment effects specific to each 
of the three prosociality measures is shown in the lower portion of the figure, where each 
obligation is accounted for by a combination of additive genetic (A), shared- (or familial) 
environment (C), and unique- environment (E) effects. The upper portion of Figure 5.1 shows the 
predicted latent mechanism for domain -general prosociality, labelled here as "Prosociality 
Mechanism ". This functions as a common pathway affecting all obligation measures, and 
through which genetic and environmental influences must be mediated. If the fit of this common 
pathway model does not differ significantly from that of the saturated model, this would provide 
support for a model of prosocial obligations as involving a general psychological mechanism 
influencing each of the three measured prosocial domains. 
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B: Specific obligation 
influences 
Note: The three measured prosocial obligations are shown in rectangles. Part A shows the 
putative common or general prosocial obligations mechanism. Part B represents putative genetic 
and environment influences for distinct prosocial obligations systems. A = Additive genetic 
effects; C= common or shared, environment effects; E = unique environment effects. 
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5.3 Results 
For each of the obligation domains, same -sex DZ twins were more highly correlated than 
were opposite -sex DZ twin pairs, suggestive of sex -limitation. Phenotypic variances, means, and 
covariances were not significantly different across zygosity and twin -order (all ps > .05) with the 
exception of MZ female twin 1 and DZ female twin 1 differing on civic -work obligations (p < 
.05); however, because we didn't see the same pattern across MZ female twin 2 and DZ female 
twin 2, as well as the large number of tests performed, we interpreted this significant effect as a 
sampling anomaly. Equating male and female DZ pairs, and DZ same -sex twin pairs to DZ 
opposite -sex pairs, did not significantly worsen model fit for any of the variables; however, to 
avoid biases in our model estimates, we analysed males and females separately. 
Intra -class twin correlations are detailed in Table 5.1. The full results of the univariate 
modelling for each domain are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1 Intra -class correlations for MZ, DZ same -sex, and DZ opposite -sex twin pairs for 
civic, work, welfare obligation, and an omnibus summed measure of prosocial obligations. 
Civic Work Ethic Welfare Prosociality 
MZ male twin pairs .32 .25 .35 .40 
MZ female twin .49 .36 .26 .37 
DZ male twin pairs .24 .13 .11 .30 
DZ female twin pairs .19 .20 .30 .27 
DZ opposite -sex .06 -.01 .05 .06 
For males across each obligation domain, including the general prosocial obligation 
scale, additive genetic and shared -environment effects were individually non -significant, 
although removing both paths simultaneously significantly worsened model fit indicating 
familial influences on each trait. For females, additive genetic and unique -environment effects 
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were significant for both civic and work obligation, with the third domain, welfare obligation, 
showing significant support only for unique- environmental influences (although dropping 
shared -environment effects reduced fit substantially, p = .06). For the general prosocial 
obligation measure, familial effects were observed: additive genetic and shared -environment 
effects were individually non -significant, but could not be dropped simultaneously without 
worsening model fit. 
Table 5.2 Standardised univariate heritability estimates for civic, work, and welfare obligation, 
and an omnibus summed measure of prosocial obligations (95% Confidence Intervals in 
brackets). 
Males Females 
A C E A C E 
Civic .14 .17 .69 .50 .00 .50 
(.00 - .44) (.00 - .39) (.56 - .83) (.30 - .60) (.00 - .15) (.40 - .62) 
Work .15 .08 .77 .38 .00 .62 
(.00 - .37) (.00 - .32) (.63 - .91) (.00 - .50) (.00 - .29) (.50 - .76) 
Welfare .34 .00 .66 .00 .28 .72 
(.00 - .46) (.00 - .34) (.54 - .81) (.00 - .36) (.00 - .37) (.60 - .82) 
General .23 .13 .64 .32 .06 .62 
Prosociality (.00 - .48) (.00 - .41) (.52 - .79) (.00 - .50) (.00 - .33) (.50 - .77) 
We next tested our full common -and -specific model of prosocial obligations. The 
phenotypic correlations between the three obligations variables were moderate -to -high (.41 - 
.68). A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that neither a one -factor model nor a model with 
three un- correlated obligations factors fitted the data well (RMSEA = .15, = 1052.09 (df = 44, 
P < .01), CFI = .71; RMSEA = .14, x2 = 848.94 (df = 44, p < .01), CFI = .77, respectively). By 
contrast, a hierarchical factor structure in which a super- ordinate "prosocial obligations" factor 
loaded on the three obligations domains fitted reasonably well (RMSEA = .07, X2 = 206.90 (df = 
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39,p < .01), CFI = .96; see Appendix C for full details). This indicated that both a common 
obligations factor and distinct obligations were present in the data. 
Having established the existence of a common prosocial obligations factor, we moved to 
biometric analyses. We compared the fit of the full common pathway model to the saturated 
model. The full common pathway model was a better fit to the data, when compared to the 
saturated model, for both males and females (AIC: 765.49 vs. 767.90, and 1295.93 vs. 1296.68, 
respectively). We next moved to tests of goodness of fit for nested common pathway models 
using the x2 test. For males, we could not drop all additive genetic and shared- environment 
effects simultaneously (Ax2 = 34.78 (8), p <.01); however, these effects were individually non- 
significant (Ax2 = 2.89 (4), p = .58; Ax2 = 1.08 (4), p = .90, respectively). As such, we retained 
both of these sources of influence for further analyses. Nested tests indicated that the specific 
genetic effects on civic and work obligation, and the shared -environment effects on civic, work, 
and welfare obligation were non -significant, and so were removed from the model (Ax2 = 2.13 
(5), p = .83). All other paths were significant and so we retained this reduced common- pathway 
model as our preferred final model for males (see Figure 5.2). 
For females, the additive genetic effect on the common prosocial obligations factor was 
significant (Ax2 = 8.55 (1), p <.01); however, the shared -environment effect to the common 
factor could be dropped without significantly worsening fit (Ax2 = 0 (1), p = 1). At the domain - 
specific level, both additive genetic and shared -environment effects were non -significant (Ax = 
2.13(3),p =. 55; Ax2 = 1.84 (3), p = .61, respectively); however, these influences could not be 
dropped simultaneously without significantly worsening fit (Ax2 = 57.62 (6), p < .01). Therefore, 
in line with the pattern of MZ -DZ intra -class correlations, we included genetic paths to civic and 
work obligation (reflecting the higher MZ to DZ correlations), and a shared -environment 
path to 
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welfare obligation (reflecting the similar MZ to DZ correlations). The final model for females is 
presented in Figure 5.2. 




Civic Welfare Civic Welfare 
.46 .56 .44 .73 
Note: Standardised path coefficients are shown, which when squared indicate the proportion of 
variance accounted for by that path. All paths are significant at the 5% level. 
5.4 Discussion 
The data confirmed the significant role of genetic influences on prosocial obligations, 
supporting both common and specific mechanisms, and suggested a distinct pattern of effects 
between the sexes. For the common prosocial obligations mechanism, additive genetic factors 
accounted for 42% of the variance for females. In males, however, while familial effects on this 
common mechanism were apparent, the available power did not allow us to distinguish between 
additive genetic and shared -environment effects. These findings suggest that further work, 
perhaps with an extended twin design (Eaves, Last, Young, & Martin, 1978), will be 
required to 
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tease apart possible mechanisms for these effects. Potential influences include both assortative- 
mating for prosociality, non -additive genetic effects (Neale & Cardon, 1992), and, importantly 
gene- environment interaction (Neale & Cardon, 1992) between the sexes (see below). 
At the domain -specific level, for males, welfare obligation showed a significant additive 
genetic component (with the other traits driven by unique- environment effects). For females, 
civic and work obligations showed significant additive genetic effects, with shared -environment 
influences underlying welfare obligations. The origin of these specific genetic influences on 
prosocial obligations is an open question. It may be that selection for stable division of work 
(Wahl, 2002), civil conflicts (Mitani, Watts, & Amsler, 2010), and welfare behaviours such as 
obligate food sharing (Gurven, 2004) have been important in shaping specific adaptations linked 
to in -group cooperation. 
Unique- environment effects were often large. While these effects partly reflect 
measurement error, they also potentially reflect gene -environment interaction (Neale & Cardon, 
1992). Given the likely differential family and social constraints placed on males and females 
enforcing compliance versus rewarding independence (Mischel & Shoda, 1995), it seems 
possible that genetic differences related to prosocial obligations may interact with these 
differentially experienced social environments. This view would be consistent with contingency - 
models of prosocial obligations supported by research noting decreases in prosocial contributions 
following social exclusion (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007) and 
knowledge of prosociality levels in the group serving as a moderator of personal investment 
(Gurven, 2006). It is also possible that men are more prosocial when they have a conducive 
social environment (e.g. having attained status, are married, etc.) and are less helpful when they 
are still competing for social resources, perhaps reflecting the greater role of unique- 
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environments in males (compared to females). This suggestion is supported by recent work 
arguing that testosterone, a steroid hormone typically produced in greater quantities in males 
(Mazur & Booth, 1998), may not be associated with aggression per se (Eisenegger, Haushofer, & 
Fehr, 2011), but rather have social consequences (to the good or the bad) depending on the status 
of the individual in question (Eisenegger et al., 2011). Accordingly, future work is recommended 
to address the question of whether a hormone (e.g. testosterone) -by- situation effect on prosocial 
behaviour is present. 
An important limitation of the present study concerns our lack of power to detect sex - 
limited effects, hence motivating our decision to model sexes separately. Accordingly, while we 
observed more modest heritable influences on the common prosocial obligations factor in males, 
we were unable to formally assess whether this quantitative difference in heritable influence is 
statistically significant. Additionally, we were unable to determine whether the genetic effects 
acting on prosocial obligations were qualitatively distinct between the sexes, although the near- 
zero correlations for DZ opposite -sex twin pairs on each of the prosocial obligations measures 
suggests gender -specific genetic factors may affect prosocial sentiment. Future work in a 
suitably powered sample is recommended to address this important issue. 
In summary, the present data that indicate a common factor underlies prosocial 
obligations across three important social domains. The results also highlight important avenues 
for additional study in line with the contrasting observation of moderate -to -large additive genetic 
factors underlying this general prosocial obligations factor in females, with modest -to- moderate 
familial factors influencing general prosocial obligations in males. Further research is required to 
explore these possible gender differences and transmission modes, as well as the possible effects 
of contingency upon obligations. 
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Cater 6: Explaining the Genetic Influence on Religiosity: The Role of Comunit 
Integration and Existential Uncertainty 
6.1 Introduction 
Worship and belief in the divine feature in all human societies recorded to date (Bulbulia, 
2004; Swatos, 1998). While some accounts of these traits have relied entirely on cultural 
transmission (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993), genetically -informative studies have shown 
that religious belief is moderately heritable (D'Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes, & Spilka, 1999), 
indicating a biological basis for religiosity. Research attempting to incorporate biological as well 
as cultural factors in explanations of religious faith suggests that belief may "recycle" more 
fundamental psychological and social processes (Boyer, 2003), such as needs for existential 
purpose and meaning in life (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010), and for social needs such 
as community integration and binding (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Here we present a multivariate 
twin -study testing the extent to which non -theological variables relating to social and existential 
needs can account for heritable bases of religious belief. 
The origins of religious belief have been of enduring interest to social and behavioural 
scientists (c.f. Dennett, 2006). Religious belief is commonly viewed as the product of 
environments designed to transmit and reinforce prevailing cultural values (Batson et al., 1993; 
Dudley & Dudley, 1986). In recent years, however, genetically -informative studies of religiosity 
have indicated that the strength of religious belief is heritable (Bouchard, McGue, Lykken, 
& 
Tellegen, 1999; D'Onofrio et al., 1999; Kendler et al., 2003). For example, Martin 
et al. (1986) 
reported significant genetic effects on attitudes such as the importance of observing 
the Sabbath 
and truthfulness of the Bible. And recently, Kendler and Myers (2009) observed 
significant 
genetic influences on frequency of church attendance. These observations give 
rise to the 
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important question of what kind of biological mechanism could underpin religious belief. Little 
is known of the mechanism(s) through which genetic factors exert their effects on religious 
belief; however, two broad accounts have been proposed that we term here: 1) the "reductionist" 
perspective, and 2) the "specificity" perspective on religious belief. 
The reductionist perspective holds that religious belief is not unique but can be reduced to 
more fundamental psychological and/or social processes (Kay, Gaucher et al., 2010; Graham & 
Haidt, 2010). Two reductionist explanations of religion have been suggested to date. The first 
suggests that religious belief emerges as a source of existential certainty, generating a sense of 
agency and control, and thus acting to reduce feelings of anxiety (Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & 
Galinsky, 2010). Supporting this idea, faith has been shown to increase when perceived 
instability is increased (Kay, Shepherd et al., 2010). Independent work supporting this 
conclusion has demonstrated that when (perceived) personal control is manipulated, belief in 
God is enhanced (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010). Interestingly, in the Rutjens 
and colleagues (2010) study, this increased belief in God was only observed in the absence of 
other belief frameworks that helped to create order in the world: in this instance, individuals 
primed to understand Darwinism as an orderly process with inevitable outcomes, did not show 
enhanced belief in God when personal control was threatened, although enhanced belief in 
Darwinism was observed for these individuals. For Kay, Gaucher et al. (2010), then, religious 
belief is seen as "recycling" this general existential certainty system, enhancing perceived 
personal control and providing an epistemic buffer from unpredictability and instability in this 
world. 
The second major reductionist account of religion also deprecates the central role 
of what 
appears to define religion - religious belief - in favor of what Graham and Haidt (2010) call a 
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"relentlessly social" (p. 140) approach. In this view, the rituals and other surface structures of 
religion are to be explained in terms of foundational moral values that bind communities into 
cohesive units facilitating cooperation and well- being. Religion, they argue, reflects the 
"binding" foundations of in -group loyalty, authority /respect, and purity /sanctity, which serve to 
generate a moral community (Graham & Haidt, 2010). 
This focus on social and community functions of religion has a long history in the 
literature. For instance, Durkheim (1915) argued that, "[t]he idea of society is the soul of 
religion" (p. 433). The social binding function of religion is also supported by research showing 
that high levels of community integration are a significant predictor of higher levels of religious 
belief (Cavendish, Welch, & Leege, 1998). Work on factors influencing church membership 
dropouts provides additional support for religious belief as a manifestation of social needs. For 
instance, Hartman (1976) asked former Methodist church members why they decided to leave 
with the most frequent response entailing "their failure to feel ... accepted, loved, or wanted" by 
others in the congregation (p. 40). With these findings in mind, religious individuals may be 
predisposed towards group life in general rather than to religious belief strictly conceived. 
In contrast to the two reductionist views of religious belief summarized above, the 
specificity perspective argues that worship of a higher power or Being reflects a source of 
motivation fundamentally distinct from any other human social and existential needs (Pargament, 
Magyar- Russell, & Murray- Swank, 2005). Examples of this mode of thought include Richards 
and Bergin (1997), who are explicit in stating that spirituality "cannot be subsumed by other 
domains such as cognitions, emotions, social systems, and so on" (p. 13). Under this perspective 
religiosity is an end in and of itself, rather than a means to an end, a position perhaps most 
clearly articulated by Johnson (1959) in suggesting that "[i]t is the ultimate Thou whom 
the 
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religious person seeks most of al!" (p. 70). The implication of the specificity position for the 
genetic architecture of religiosity is that attempts to reduce heritable effects on religious belief to 
more general psychological and social processes will fail. 
Two predictions can be derived from reductionist perspectives on religion. Firstly, if 
religiosity is explained by community integration (Graham & Haidt, 2010) then the genetic 
effects on religion should be accounted for by this variable. Secondly, if need for existential 
meaning underlies the heritable bases of religious belief, then again, this variable should account 
for the genetic effects on religiosity, with no religion -specific effects required to provide a well - 
fitting model. If both of these models provide partial accounts of religious belief, then their 
inclusion should lead to significant reductions in the specific heritable effects on religious belief. 
If specificity accounts are correct, neither of these variables, assessing non -theological concerns, 
should be able to account for the genetic variance in religious belief. Here we test these 
hypotheses in a large, nationally representative sample of identical, or monozygotic, and 
fraternal, or dizygotic, twins. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Phenotypic data were available for 993 pairs of twins assessed for religiosity, community 
integration, and existential uncertainty contacted by the MacArthur Foundation Survey of 
Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS; Brim, Ryff, & Kessler, 2004; see Chapter 
4 
for more details of the sample and collection process). Of the monozygotic (MZ) pairs, 
178 were 
male (mean age = 44.47, SD = 11.53) and 192 were female (mean age = 43.56, 
SD = 12.28). Of 
the dizygotic (DZ) pairs, 143 were male (mean age = 44.25, SD = 12.35), 
214 were female 
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(mean age = 45.90, SD = 12.53), and 266 were opposite -sex pairs (mean age = 45.77, SD = 
11.85). 
6.2.2 Measures 
Religiosity was measured with the following items: "How religious are you ? "; "How 
important is religion in your life ? "; "How important is it for you - or would it be if you had 
children nott' - to send your children for religious or spiritual services or instruction ?" (1: Not at 
all, to 4: Very). These items were highly correlated (.54 - .81, all p values < .01) and were thus 
summed into a composite religiosity score. Although additional indicators of religious 
belief /commitment were available, we selected only those items that did not make explicit 
reference to social manifestations of religiosity (e.g. attendance at a place of worship, 
identification with a religious group), or to items where religiosity was related to existential 
meaning (e.g. coping, divine support), so as to avoid confounding the test of our core hypothesis 
through content overlap. 
Community integration was measured with the following three items: "I don't feel I 
belong to anything 1 'cl call a community" (reverse- scored); "/feel close to other people in my 
community "; "My community is a source of comfort" (1: Disagree strongly, to 7: Agree strongly). 
These items were significantly correlated (.41 - .57, all p values < .01) and were thus summed 
into a composite score. Existential uncertainty was measured with the following two items: "The 
world is too complex for me "; " 1 cannot make sense of what's going on in the world" (1: 
Disagree strongly, to 7: Agree strongly). These items were significantly correlated (.44, p < .01) 
and were summed into a composite score. 
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6.2.3 Analysis 
The classical twin design partitions observed variation into three latent components: 
additive genetic influences (A), shared -environmental influences (C; environmental influences 
fostering similarities within twin pairs), and unique -environmental influences (E). Genetic 
effects are inferred when monozygotic (MZ) twins are more similar than dizygotic (DZ) twins, 
whereas shared -environment effects are inferred when MZ twin correlations are less than twice 
that of the DZ twins. Unique- environment effects are inferred when MZ twins are correlated less 
than at unity for a given trait, and this variance component thus also contains measurement error. 
Prior to conducting the analyses, we controlled for the effects of age and sex, and standardised 
residuals were used in all subsequent analyses (McGue & Bouchard, 1984). The models were 
estimated by full- information maximum -likelihood analysis using OpenMx (Boker et al., 2010a; 
Boker et al., 2010b) and R (R Core Development Team, 2009). 
The contrasting hypotheses that genetic variance in religiosity does or does not derive 
from the genetics of existential uncertainty and community integration were tested in a 
multivariate Cholesky decomposition (Neale & Cardon, 1992) of additive genetic, shared - 
environment, and unique- environment covariance between the measures (see Figure 6.1). 
6.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics are detailed in Table 6.1. MZ correlations were notably higher than 
for DZ pairs on all measures, implying the presence of genetic effects (see Table 6.2). The 
phenotypic correlations between community integration and existential uncertainty, and 
religiosity were .27 (p < .01) and .01 (p = .68), respectively. Assumption testing of means, 
variances, and phenotypic covariances across twin order and zygosity were all p > .05, 
with the 
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exception of MZ twin land DZ twin 1 for community integration- existential uncertainty: p < 
.05). Because of the large number of tests performed, this was interpreted as a sampling 
anomaly. Neither scalar nor general sex -limitation effects were significant (male and female DZ 
pairs, and same and opposite -sex groups could be equated without significant loss of model fit 
for any of the variables). Thus males and females were pooled for subsequent analyses. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for community integration, existential uncertainty, and religiosity 
across zygosity 
Mean (SD) MZm mean (SD) MZf mean (SD) DZm mean (SD) DZf mean (SD) DZos mean (SD) 
Integ. 14.48 (4.31) 14.26 (4.46) 14.87 (4.22) 14.72 (3.93) 14.44 (4.35) 14.17 (4.48) 
Ex. 9.15 (3.22) 9.81 (3.10) 8.77 (3.28) 9.73 (3.17) 8.45 (3.24) 9.29 (3.12) 
Relig. 5.71 (2.21) 6.20 (2.48) 5.34 (2.13) 5.90 (2.17) 5.14 (1.80) 6.06 (2.29) 
Note: For community integration a high score equals high integration; for existential uncertainty 
a low score equals higher uncertainty; for religiosity a low score equals higher religiosity. 
We next established the univariate heritability of each of our variables. Both community 
integration and existential uncertainty were best explained by models containing additive genetic 
and unique- environment effects (shared- environment effects could be removed without 
significantly worsening model fit: Axe = 0, p = 1; and Ax = 0, p = 1, respectively): additive 
genetic and unique- environment effects explained 31% and 69% of the variance in community 
integration, and 36% and 64% of the variance in existential uncertainty. For religiosity, additive 
genetic, shared -environment, and unique- environment effects were all statistically significant, 
explaining 26 %, 26 %, and 48% of the variance, respectively. Full results of the univariate 
modeling are detailed in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Univariate modeling results and intra -class twin pair correlations for community 
integration, existential uncertainty, and religiosity. 































Note: A = additive genetic effects; C = shared -environment effects; E = unique -environment 
effects; MZr, DZr and OSr are the intra -class correlations for MZ, same -sex DZ, and opposite - 
sex DZ twin pairs, respectively (95% Confidence Intervals shown in brackets) 
We next moved to a test of our core hypotheses. We built a multivariate model comprised 
of community integration, existential uncertainty, and religiosity. The specific genetic effects on 
religiosity in the full model were estimated at .1 indicating that community integration and 
existential uncertainty broadly accounted for the genetic variation in religiosity (note that in the 
univariate case, the equivalent parameter estimate for religiosity was .51). Moreover, this 
specific genetic effect for religiosity could be dropped without a significant loss of fit (Ax2 (1) _ 
I, p = 1), indicating that genetic effects underlying community integration and existential 
uncertainty were sufficient to explain the heritable bases underpinning religiosity. Further tests 
examining whether religiosity could be reduced to just community integration or existential 
uncertainty in each case significantly worsened fit (Ax2 (1) = 6.09, p = .01; Axe (1) = 
4.33, p = 
.04, respectively) indicating that genetic bases underpinning religiosity could not 
be explained 
solely by community integration or existential uncertainty. Genetic correlations 
in the full 
(unreduced) model for community integration and existential uncertainty 
were as follows: 
community integration -religiosity r = .67; existential uncertainty -religiosity 
r = .33, again 
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supporting strong genetic links from community integration and existential uncertainty to 
religiosity. The final model is detailed in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Final model of shared- and unique -environment effects (standardised path coefficients) 
for community integration, existential uncertainty, and religiosity. 
Cl C2 C3 E1 E2 E3 
Community Integration -.07 .84 
Existential Uncertainty .18 .00 -.16 .79 
Religiosity .51 .00 .00 .02 .04 .69 
Note: C = shared -environment effects; E = unique -environment effects 
Figure 6.1 Final model of additive genetic effects on community integration, existential 
uncertainty, and religiosity. 
Note: Circles represent latent additive genetic variables. Path values are standardised 
path 
coefficients (squaring the path loading indicates the proportion of variance accounted 
for in the 
measured variable by the latent factor). 
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6.4 Discussion 
Compatible with previous work in this field (e.g. Bouchard et al., 1999; D'Onofrio et al., 
1999) religiosity was moderately heritable. Existential uncertainty and community integration 
were also under partial genetic control, with approximately a third of the variance in each case 
accounted for by heritable factors. Most importantly, and in line with the reductionist 
hypotheses, the genetic effects on religiosity were fully accounted for by genetic effects on 
existential uncertainty and community integration. 
Community integration showed a strong relationship to religiosity, with a genetic 
correlation of .67. By contrast, existential uncertainty and religiosity showed a more moderate 
genetic correlation of .33 (although this may reflect the possible lower reliability of this construct 
as compared to community integration). This indicates that at least for this component of 
religious belief, social needs appear to be the predominant motivating concern, supporting the 
theorising of Graham and Haidt (2010). However, as indicated by the significant genetic 
correlation of existential certainty with religiosity, this community- binding model was not a 
sufficient account of religiosity. A more complete understanding of religiosity, then, would 
integrate elements of both of these theories, viewing religion as both a tool for the formation of 
communities, as suggested by Graham and Haidt (2010), and also as a facility for meeting 
existential needs as emphasized by Kay, Gaucher et al. (2010). 
These findings give rise to the natural question of whether genetic effects on religiosity, 
here reduced to heritable variation underlying community and existential needs, can be further 
reduced to more "fundamental" traits. A number of constructs are plausible candidates. Of the 
five factors of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), extraversion and agreeableness are 
characterised as traits concerned with gregarious, social, and cooperative behaviour (Costa & 
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McCrae, 1992). As such, these traits may account for some of the heritable variance underlying 
community integration, and in turn religious beliefs. Furthermore, neuroticism is characterised 
by anxiety and fearfulness (Gray & McNaughton, 2003), and so is plausibly linked to (low) 
existential certainty. Additionally, general cognitive ability, with existing (negative) associations 
to religious belief (e.g. Bertsch & Pesta, 2009; Lewis, Ritchie, & Bates, under review), may also 
relate to existential certainty by increasing understanding and comprehension of complex events, 
thus decreasing uncertainty directly. Both neuroticism and general cognitive ability, then, are 
candidates for future work seeking to further decompose the genetic effects underlying both 
existential uncertainty and religiosity. 
Speculatively, the current findings indicate that religion per -sé may not be the sole 
organisation or system able to fill the niche created by human needs for community and 
existential meaning. The succession, displacement, and evolution of religions can be viewed in 
this light as the shaping of religious systems by their adherents to maximise the extent to which 
their needs are met. It might be predicted, then, that under certain conditions even a secular 
apparatus, should it be able to meet the community and existential needs of people, may be 
attributed the same importance in people's lives as religion often occupies (Kay, Shepherd et al., 
2010). Graham and Haidt (2010), however, suggest this "exchangeable goods" notion of religion 
may fail to acknowledge the tight fit between religious belief and human psychology: "Is there 
anything special or necessary about religion? If we can see the wonders of group cohesion in 
maypole dances or college football games, then why can't we get rid of Gods and religions and 
swap in secular practices? In our view, religious practices and rituals co- evolved with 
religiously inclined minds, so that they now fit together extremely well...Modern cultural 
creativity can generate endless practices that trigger or exploit many of the same 
mental 
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systems...But, because of our biological and cultural -evolutionary history, it's hard to come up 
with anything that "fits " or satisfies as many people as does religion. God is the original 
iopole, and groups that do maypole dances well have outcompeted those that don't, for many 
thousands of years" (p. 147). The extent to which religion is an exchangeable good thus remains 
to be seen. 
A limitation of the present study is that the sample is nearly -exclusively comprised of 
individuals reporting affiliations with Christian religious denominations (> 95 %). Future 
research should address whether these findings generalise to additional religions, such as Islam 
and Judaism, but also non -Abrahamic religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism, as 
well as across cultures (Sasaki & Kim, 2010). It is also important to acknowledge that religious 
belief is a multidimensional construct (Hill & Hood, 1999; Kendler et al., 2003). As such, while 
the strength and importance of religious belief in one's life is a central and widely recognised 
component of religious belief, other aspects of religious life warrant study. Doctrinal literalism 
and spirituality, for instance, are worthy targets of future research. In particular, the extent to 
which community and existential foundations can (or cannot) be extended to the doctrinal and 
spiritual characteristics of religion will be of interest for further studies. 
In summary, our results indicate that the genetic influences underlying existential 
uncertainty and community integration completely explain the genetic effects underlying a 
measure of religious belief reflecting the strength and importance of religion in one's life. 
Additional familial influences were observed for religiosity, in line with previous work, although 
these effects were non -significant for both existential uncertainty and community integration. 
These findings shed light on the role of religion as a system for meeting basic social and 
existential needs, and for the additional role of cultural transmission in shaping the strength of 
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religious beliefs. Future work 
should seek to generalise these findings to other religions, such as 
Judaism and Islam, and cultures, as well as to examine the reducibility of additional aspects of 
religious belief, such as doctrinal literalism and spirituality. 
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Chapter 7 - General Discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to make a substantive contribution to knowledge concerning 
the origins of social and political attitudes. In this chapter I first briefly summarise the core 
findings of the thesis. I then discuss the broader implications of the work reported here for 
theory. Finally, I outline work that might be conducted to extend the findings of the current 
thesis and thus to shed further light on the origins of social and political attitudes. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The work reported here utilised two perspectives which have largely been untapped in 
prior work on the origins of social and political origins: personality system theory (McCrae & 
Costa, 1999) and behavioural genetics (Falconer & MacKay, 1996). Several important results 
were noted. Firstly, in Chapter 3, a personality system model of political conservatism was tested 
in two large samples (447 UK undergraduates and 476 mature US adults; published as Lewis & 
Bates, 201 l a). Basic traits of personality were observed to exert significant effects upon political 
conservatism; however, these influences were largely exerted via an intermediary layer of 
characteristic adaptations, in this case the moral values of individualizing and binding (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). These findings help to clarify why previous work in the literature has 
often failed to find the personality- conservatism association in the absence of this intermediary 
layer. Put simply, behaviours such as voting conservative are multi- faceted in their nature: 
political attitudes are determined by multiple moral attitudes, with each proximal moral factor in 
turn possessing multiple overlapping or distinct personality underpinnings. Focus on the third 
level of behaviour (here on conservative political attitudes), without acknowledging these 
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intermediary values masks the significant role personality plays in generating political attitudes 
and can thus hide these sources of influence. 
Secondly, across three study -sets (Chapters 4 -6), the genetic architecture of several social 
attitudes was examined utilising a large, representative US sample of adult twin pairs (MIDUS: 
Midlife in the United States; Brim et al., 1995 -1996). In Chapter 4 we asked, firstly, whether 
three forms of in -group favouritism (religious, ethnic, and racial) contain significant genetic 
underpinnings, and secondly, whether heritable effects on race favouritism could be accounted 
for by broad favouritism genes, or whether specific genetic effects were required to understand 
this aspect of favouritism. The findings indicated that a common genetic factor facilitates 
generalised favouritism, which we term the Common Affiliation Mechanism (CAM), with 
evidence for additional genetic effects specific to each form of group favouritism. These fmdings 
(published as Lewis & Bates, 2010) suggest that (at least) at the genetic level, race (as well as 
ethnic and religious) favouritism is multiply determined. 
In Chapter 5, we examined whether prosocial obligations across the domains of welfare, 
work, and civic obligation share a common genetic basis, or reflect specific heritable 
components (published as Lewis & Bates, 2011b). This study was important as mixed results 
concerning the heritability of prosociality had been reported in the literature (e.g. Krueger, 
Hicks, & McGue, 2001; Rushton, 2004), as well as an absence in work addressing the genetic 
architecture of broader prosocial domains (such as those noted above). In females, results 
indicated the existence of a common and substantially heritable factor underlying each of these 
prosocial obligations. In males, a prosocial factor was also observed; modest -to- moderate 
familial effects (genetic and shared -environment effects were indistinguishable) influenced 
this 
general mechanism. At the domain -specific level, modest genetic effects were 
observed in 
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females for civic and work obligations, with shared -environment effects influencing welfare 
obligations. In males, genetic influences were observed for welfare obligation, with unique - 
environments affecting work and civic duty. These findings confirm previous work indicating 
that prosocial obligations contain a heritable basis, but that additional genetic factors influence 
specific components of prosociality, such as obligations in work and toward civic duty. The data 
also suggest that sex -limited effects may be present that future work is recommended to further 
explore. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we presented work examining the genetic architecture of religious 
belief (Lewis & Bates, under review). Although genetic factors have been known to influence 
strength of religious belief for some time (e.g. Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, & Tellegen, 
1990), the psychological mechanism(s) through which this biological influence is manifest were 
poorly understood prior to this work. Two non -theological constructs - 1) need for community 
integration and 2) need for existential certainty - were hypothesised to account for the genetic 
effects on religiosity, in line with recent (and more classic) work in the literature (Durkheim, 
1915; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2010; Graham & Haidt, 2010). The results supported these 
hypotheses, with genetic influences on these traits of community integration and existential 
certainty wholly accounting for the heritable basis of religiosity. This finding suggests that 
religion "re- uses" systems involved in meeting both social and existential needs. 
7.2 Implications for Theory 
7.2.1 Social and Political Attitudes are Heritable 
Although behavioural geneticists are used to observing heritable effects 
on psychological 
traits (e.g. Turkheimer, 2000), firm knowledge as to whether this genetic 
influence extends to 
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social and political attitudes was largely absent until recently (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005), 
and still underexplored several years later. Thus, the observation of substantial genetic effects on 
in -group favouritism, and modest -to- moderate effects on prosocial obligations and religious 
belief, particularly in light of wide - spread scepticism of whether genetic influences extend to 
such attitudes (Charney, 2008a), represents an important collection of insights for the attitudes 
literature. The implications of this observation for understanding attitude formation are 
potentially profound: attitude origins can no longer be considered solely in light of 
environmental factors as has often been assumed to be the case (e.g. De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001; Watson, 1924/193 1). Instead, systematic work must begin to establish a 
neurobiological explanation capable of reflecting the observed genetic effects. Possible avenues 
of exploration in this domain are detailed below (see Section 7.3). 
7.2.2 Complex Phenotypic and Genetic Architectures 
As noted in detail in Chapter 1, both quantitative and molecular genetic work into the 
biological bases of social and political attitudes has been a topic of growing interest (e.g. Alford 
et al., 2005). However, in line with findings from Chapter 3 utilising personality system theory, 
if political conservatism can be "built" (more or less) equivalently via different routes e.g. 
through high extraversion and low openness or through high conscientiousness and low 
agreeableness, then molecular studies will struggle or even fail to discover loci underlying the 
conservatism phenotype on account of its content complexity (e.g. van der Sluis, Verhage, 
Posthuma, & Dolan, 2010). Genetically informative work detailed in Chapters 4 -6 further 
extend 
this point to a framework including other social attitude constructs: for each of the attitudes 
we 
examined, we found significant support for at least two distinct genetic influences. 
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Furthermore, personality system theory postulates that all biological factors underlying 
psychological traits are manifest at the first layer, the so- called "basic tendencies" of personality. 
While this assertion is ultimately an empirical question that has yet to be well- tested, and likely 
underestimates the scope of basic tendencies of relevance to attitude origins (e.g. general 
cognitive ability; Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008), it supports a gene- discovery strategy for social 
and political attitudes that focuses on basic personality traits, on account of their (putative) 
higher heritable bases, as well as the fact that characteristic adaptations will reflect 
environmental effects from which basic personality traits are argued to be largely inoculated 
(McCrae & Costa, 1999). Important work in this domain lies ahead. 
7.2.3 The Role of the Shared -Environment 
A frequent observation from studies in the behavioural genetics literature is that shared - 
environment effects on psychological traits are zero or near -zero (Bouchard, 2004). For several 
of the social attitudes reported in the current thesis, shared -environment presented non -negligible 
influences. Religious belief was seen to be moderately affected by shared -environment, in line 
with some previous work (D'Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes, & Spilka, 1999), and components 
of prosocial obligations were also, in part, under this influence. Although further work is 
required to establish the robustness of these findings, remaining mindful of these somewhat 
unusual findings until further studies in this domain have been reported would likely be wise. 
7.2.4 Personality Exerts Significant Influences on Social and Political Attitudes 
Although the title of this sub -section would perhaps not surprise many (e.g. Sniderman, 
1975), in fact, the conclusion that personality is a significant influence on political conservatism 
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is less well- supported in the literature than is commonly imagined, and has in fact been argued to 
be not the case (e.g. Alford & Hibbing, 2007). Importantly, the finding reported in this thesis that 
personality affects politics via intermediary moral values clarifies mixed results, and paves the 
way for more sophisticated models of political attitudes; models formulated so as to take account 
of multiple levels of analysis. This mode of thought has begun to appear in the literature in recent 
years (e.g. Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b), although considerable work still remains to fully explicate 
a system model of political attitudes that is fully able to account for the origins of political 
attitudes (see Section 7.3.1 for further discussion of some of the issues that remain). 
7.3 Future Possibilities 
Genetically informative work reported in previous chapters has identified significant 
heritable components for a range of social attitudes. This set of observations gives rise to 
questions concerning the nature of these biological factors: what functions and structures in the 
brain generate attitudes? And while personality system theory provides important insights into 
the aetiology of political conservatism, what avenues for further advances can this framework 
provide? In the coming sections I briefly address avenues of research that the current findings 
open up for exploration. 
7.3.1 Personality System Model of Social and Political Attitudes: Extensions 
The outlines of a personality system model were first proposed as recently as the very 
late 1990s (e.g. McCrae & Costa, 1999). Work in Chapter 3 illustrated the usefulness of framing 
political attitudes within this type of model, but also the need to expand it, and to more clearly 
specify what occurs in each level. Most immediately, this model highlights the indirect routes 
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through which personality may exert influences on politics; namely, via moral values constructs 
of binding and individualizing. However, despite this theoretical contribution to the political 
psychology literature, a number of important issues need to be resolved before this model can 
form an adequate account of the origins of social and political attitudes. McCrae and Costa 
(2006), originators of this framework, duly acknowledge these current limitations in personality 
system theory: "There is as yet nothing like an adequate taxonomy of processes, and creating 
such a taxonomy should become a priority for personality theorists" (p. 164). 
Firstly, it is currently unclear how constructs outside the domain of the five- factor model 
(i.e. factors and facets) should be integrated into the personality system model. For example, 
(higher) general cognitive ability has been associated with liberal attitudes (Deary, Batty, & 
Gale, 2008) and with lower levels of religious belief (Bertsch & Pesta, 2009), especially 
fundamentalism (Lewis, Ritchie, & Bates, under review; Nyborg, 2009). Moreover, evolutionary 
psychologists argue that humans possess a large array of psychological adaptations, of which at 
least some will relate to political attitudes and actions e.g. psychological processes adapted to 
coalition affiliation (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001) and evaluating the adequacy with 
which others are treating you (Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009). Theory in the respective 
literatures of intelligence and evolutionary psychology indicates that these constructs should be 
viewed as operating at the primary layer (i.e. as basic tendencies). It is not clear, however, what 
representation these variables may have at the second level, where interactions with the 
environment occur, and where interactions between, say, intelligence and feelings of anger might 
occur in influencing constrained or unconstrained behavior. For example, how might coalitional 
adaptations relate to personality traits, some of which themselves are characterised 
as traits 
reflecting affiliation and gregariousness (e.g. extraversion)? Attempts to understand 
how the 
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individual differences approach to personality could be integrated with an adaptationist 
perspective are rare in the literature but such a task will be important for generating a full model 
of social and political attitude origins. 
Secondly, while our intermediary layer of characteristic adaptations incorporated two 
robust predictors of political attitudes - Haidt's moral values constructs of binding and 
individualizing (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) - it is currently unclear whether additional 
predictive validity could be achieved by incorporating further constructs such as social 
dominance orientation (SDO) and right -wing authoritarianism (RWA), each with strong links to 
political conservatism themselves (e.g. Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). McFarland (2010) has made a 
noteworthy initial contribution to this issue, demonstrating that both empathy (the empathic 
concern and perspective taking subscales of Davis's (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index) and 
principled moral reasoning (using the revised five -item Defining Issues Test; Rest, Narvaez, 
Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999), predict levels of prejudice over and above effects of SDO and RWA; 
however, future work is recommended to include Haidt's moral values alongside further 
predictors of social and political attitudes (e.g. political conservatism) to establish the full extent 
of the intermediary layer of characteristic adaptations. 
Thirdly, the issue of which environmental factors moderate effects of personality on the 
intermediary layer of values, and on one's political attitudes, is currently underexplored. 
Personality system theory, while recognising the importance of environment effects, does not 
explicitly address the specific environmental factors or processes that shape attitudes; however, 
several plausible candidate environmental modulators of attitudes and behaviour have been 
identified in the literature and are presented here in brief: 1) Social exclusion: experimental 
manipulations increasing exclusion have been shown to decrease prosocial behaviour 
(Twenge, 
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Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007); 2) Status: increases in perceived social status 
have been linked to decreases in prosocial behaviour (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 
2010); moreover, individuals with higher absolute social standing engage in greater moral 
hypocrisy (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010); 3) Threat: a number of studies (both 
longitudinal and experimental) have shown situational threat increases conservative and /or 
authoritarian attitudes (Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; 
Duckitt and Fisher, 2003; Willer, 2004). 4) Political expertise /sophistication: work has 
demonstrated that attitudes are more coherently structured/logically consistent as a function of 
political sophistication (e.g. Converse, 2000; Jennings, 1992). 
Finally, as Bloom (2010) notes, although in recent years values have more frequently 
become understood as the output of "gut instincts" (Haidt, 2007), values can clearly change over 
time. This suggests that effort needs to be expended to find the mechanisms of this change: 
"Emotional responses alone cannot explain one of the most interesting aspects of human nature: 
that morals evolve... What is missing, I believe, is an understanding of the role of deliberate 
persuasion." (Bloom, 2010, p. 490). Considerable work has been conducted in the attitude 
change /persuasion domain (e.g. the elaboration likelihood model; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986); 
however, integrating these persuasion models into a broader framework such as the personality 
system model has not (to my knowledge) been attempted and would represent a valuable step 
forward. 
7.3.2 Neural Bases of Social and Political Attitudes 
Work in this thesis observing substantial genetic effects on several social 
attitudes 
constricts gives rise to the important question of how these biological influences 
might be 
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instantiated in neural terms. Although work of this kind is largely in its infancy, some 
encouraging results have been reported in recent years, representing both neuroanatomical and 
functional imaging association with social and political attitudes. 
Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) report an association between political 
conservatism and conflict -related activity during a Go/No -Go task (measured with event -related 
potentials) originating in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The authors interpret this finding 
as evidence that liberals possess "greater neurocognitive sensitivity to cues for altering a 
habitual response pattern" (p. 1246). Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, and Nash (2009) support this 
association between conservatism/traditionalism and ACC function, fording that greater religious 
belief was associated with decreased activity in the ACC following error in a Stroop task. In this 
paper, however, the authors suggest that rather than ACC activity influencing subsequent 
traditional attitudes (as suggested by Amodio et al., 2007), decreased ACC activity reflects the 
fact that "religious conviction buffers against anxiety by providing meaning systems" (p. 390), 
although they accept that establishing direction of causation requires further experimentation. 
Beyond links to ACC, amygdala activity has been noted to be significantly increased 
when individuals view faces of out -group vs. in -group individuals. Hart et al. (2000) showed that 
both Black and White individuals showed a stronger amygdala response to other -race faces, and 
Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham (2008) demonstrated that this effect extends to learned out - 
group members irrespective of race. Neuroanatomical work provides partial support for 
functional imaging findings linking political conservatism to ACC and amygdala. For instance, 
Kanai, Feilden, Firth, and Rees (2011) recently reported that increased gray matter volume in the 
anterior cingulate cortex and decreased volume of the right amygdala predicts political liberalism 
(measured with a single item) in young adults. 
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Empathy (conceptually linked to the moral values of harm and fairness) has been 
associated with activation in the right ventral medial prefrontal cortex (Shamay -Tsoory, Tomer, 
Berger, & Aharon- Peretz, 2003). Observing pain in others also activates anterior cingulate cortex 
(bilaterally), right middle frontal gyrus, and left superior frontal gyrus (Morrison, Lloyd, di 
Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004). Unfair treatment of (liked) others is associated with activity in 
anterior cingulate cortex and insula (Singer et al., 2006). In neuroanatomical terms, empathy has 
been associated with volume of the right temporal pole, right fusiform gyrus, and right 
caudate /subcallosal gyrus (Rankin et al., 2006), and left inferior frontal gyrus (Shamay -Tsoory, 
Aharon -Peretz, & Perry, 2009). DeYoung et al. (2010) related agreeableness (with links to 
individualizing and empathy) to smaller volumes in the posterior left superior temporal sulcus, 
and larger volumes in posterior cingulate, fusiform gyrus (with suggestive evidence, although 
non -significant after correction for multiple testing, for higher volumes predicting agreeableness 
in middle temporal gyrus, and lower volumes predicting agreeableness in precentral gyrus, 
precuneus, and middle frontal gyrus). Finally, Moll et al. (2011) noted that degeneration 
(following frontotemporal dementia) of the frontopolar and ventromedial frontal areas was 
associated with decreases in prosocial behaviour, which the authors suggest "could be attributed 
to a generalized emotional blunting" (p. 1735). However, as Kanai and Rees (2011) note, it is 
not yet clear how these structural correlates relate to underlying mechanisms of social behaviour. 
What mechanism(s) might account for these links between certain brain regions and 
social and political attitudes? In the case of amygdala and prejudice attitudes, one possibility is 
the role of the amygdala in fear- conditioning (LeDoux, 2003). Recent behavioural work 
has 
indicated that implicit and explicit race prejudice is predicted by negative- affect conditionability 
(Livingston & Drwecki, 2007; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005), supporting 
this 
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"amygdala- conditioning -prejudice" account. Amygdala activation has also been associated with 
disgust sensitivity (Harris & Fiske, 2004), which is, in turn, linked with prejudice (e.g. Hodson & 
Costello, 2007), perhaps as a form of psychological prophylaxis (Schaller & Duncan, 2007). This 
disgust association may reflect a unique route to prejudice or reflect broader aversive - 
conditioning links: future work should explore these possibilities, particularly in a genetically - 
informative design to establish how these factors might mediate heritable effects on favouritism. 
This approach has already been successful as exampled by work demonstrating significant 
genetic links between brain volume and general cognitive ability (e.g. Posthuma et al., 2002), 
and once robust candidate regions for social and political traits have been identified from 
phenotypic work, powerful insights into the biological bases of attitudes stand to be made from 
placing the CTD within a social neuroscience framework. 
It is currently unclear how links between ACC (among other regions), and political 
conservatism should be interpreted. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, conservatism is multiply 
determined and so these associations may reflect values concerning fairness and equality (e.g. 
individualizing), group norms and authoritarianism (e.g. binding), or other constructs. As noted 
above, ACC is activated both when (liked) others are mistreated (Singer et al., 2006), perhaps 
reflecting individualizing, as well as when response -patterns require updating, with decreased 
ability to do so putatively representing a "conservative" capacity (Amodio et al., 2007). 
Research seeking to establish the precise set of social and political attitudes associated with the 
volume and functional activation of a given region will allow more specific hypotheses to be 
tested concerning underlying mechanisms. 
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7.3.3 Hormonal Bases of Social and Political Attitudes 
Complementing work elucidating the neural bases of social and political attitudes, several 
neurotransmitter and hormone systems have been implicated in behaviour of relevance to such 
traits. Below, I briefly discuss a core sub -set of these candidates (testosterone and oxytocin) and 
close by suggesting further work in this domain, in line with work reported in this thesis, which 
might further illuminate biological bases of social and political attitudes. 
The experimental administration of testosterone (T) decreases recognition of fear and 
anger (van Honk & Schutter, 2007), reduces empathic behaviour (Hermans et al 2006), 
particularly as a function of 2D:4D digit ratio (a somatic marker of foetal androgen exposure; 
van Honk et al., 2011), and erodes social trust (Bos et al., 2010). Higher T also relates to desire 
for social dominance (especially after defeat), but only with accompanying low cortisol (Mehta 
& Josephs, 2010). However, Eisenegger et al. (2010) note that higher T predicts benevolent 
behaviour in ultimatum games. This raises the possibility that T may manifest its effect in a 
contingent manner, perhaps as a function of social status or position (van Honk, Terburg, Bos, & 
2011). Finally, T has been associated with enhanced in -group connectedness (Edwards et al., 
2006), suggesting a role for T in generating intergroup bias; again, however, this effect may be 
contingent on circumstance such that high T individuals who are threatened may become desire 
affiliation with in -group members whereas when threat is low may proffer benefits to out -group 
individuals as a means of enhancing dominance. 
Oxytocin (OXT) has similarly pronounced social behavioural effects. Intra -nasal 
administration of OXT enhances trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005) and increases socio- cognitive 
abilities (e.g. emotion recognition; Domes et al., 2007). OXT facilitates parochial 
altruism, with 
administration of OXT increasing in -group favouritism (De Dreu et al., 2010; 
2011), although 
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not out -group derogation. Finally, OXT decreases aversive responses to fear -conditioned stimuli 
(Petrovic, Kalisch, Singer, & Dolan, 2008), and, at the neural level, appears to exert this effect 
via down -regulating amygdala activation (Petrovic et al., 2008). These data, however, lead to the 
(apparently) paradoxical situation that OXT administration reduces amygdala activation, a region 
with associations to out -group enmity (Hart et al., 2000), yet does not enhance out -group love 
(although does enhance in -group love) at a behavioural level. 
The links between both T and OXT, and multiple social behaviours, including (dis)trust, 
social dominance, and parochial altruism, indicate that better understandings of the functional 
bases of these hormones, both at the behavioural and neural level, may reveal foundational 
biological insights to social and political attitudes. Research has begun to address such questions 
with studies reporting associations between basal T and fundamentalist religious attitudes among 
teenage boys in Gaza living under the Second Intifada (Victoroff et al., 2010), and between basal 
T and utilitarian moral decision -making (Carney & Mason, 2010). And as noted above, De Dreu 
et al. (2010; 2011) have demonstrated that OXT is associated with ethnocentrism. Nonetheless, 
many important questions remained unanswered, notably issues of the role of hormone -by- 
context interactions (e.g. van Honk et al., 2011). For example, does T enhance out -group 
derogation, especially when out -group threat is salient/experimentally raised? And does OXT 
attenuate this threat effect? In line with evidence suggesting that T reduces recognition of 
socially corrective signals (fear and anger in others) and enhances dominance seeking, does T 
predict (lower) levels of compromise in social exchanges? And if so, is this effect moderated by 
status? Conversely, does OXT facilitate compromise in social exchange? How 
do we reconcile 
research indicating OXT facilitates ethnocentrism, yet increases trust: 
Does OXT increase 
attachment behaviours to group members but also facilitates newcomers 
to the in -group (if not 
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necessarily raising warmth for those who are in the out -group)? Moving to functional imaging, 
OXT decreases aversive responses to fear -conditioned stimuli via amygdala down -regulation; 
however, is this effect also present when out -group stimuli are used? And does OXT 
administration reduce /extinguish in -group /out -group differences in empathy for pain experienced 
in others? 
Clearly, many questions remain to be answered with regards to the role of hormones on 
attitudes; however, early work suggests the field of social endocrinology will be fundamental in 
generating insights into individual differences underlying social and political attitudes. 
7,4 Summary 
In summary, across four study -sets, several core results stand out. Firstly, basic 
personality traits significantly influence political conservatism, although these effects are often 
complex and indirect. Secondly, in -group favouritism contains several underlying genetic 
components: specifically, we observed a common favouritism genetic factor influencing 
preferences to religious, ethnic, and racial in- groups, as well as specific genetic effects to each of 
these domains of favouritism. Thirdly, prosocial obligations across the domains of work, civic, 
and welfare were shown to be underpinned by a common heritable factor, but with suggestions 
of sex -limited effects: genetic effects explained a larger proportion of variation in this common 
factor prosociality than for males. Additional specific genetic effects were observed for these 
prosocial domains (on civic and work for females; on welfare for males). Finally, an 
examination 
of the genetic architecture of religious belief, seeking to explain the underlying psychological 
bases through which biological influences are manifest revealed that heritable 
effects on need for 
community and existential certainty fully accounted for the genetic bases of 
religiosity. In 
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closing, the collection of studies presented in the current thesis contributes to the literature by 
supporting and extending previous work indicating social attitudes possess significant genetic 
bases, as well as to demonstrate that social attitudes are multiply determined, both at the genetic 
and the phenotypic level. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Favouritism Measures 
Scale from 1 -4 (1 = Very closely; 2 = Somewhat closely; 3 = Not very closely; 4 = Not at all 
closely) 
Religious Favouritism 
i. How closely do you identify with being a member of your religious group? 
ii. How much do you prefer to be with other people who are the same religion as you? 
iii. How important do you think it is for people of your religion to marry other people who 
are the same religion? 
Ethnic Favouritism 
i. How closely do you identify with other people who are of the same ethnic descent as yourself? 
ii. How much do you prefer to be with other people who are of this same ethnic group? 
iii. How important do you think it is for people who are from this ethnic group to marry other 
people who are also from this ethnic group? 
Race Favouritism 
i. How closely do you identify with being a member of your racial group? 
n. How much do you prefer to be with other people who are the same race as yourself? 
iii. How important do you think it is for people who are in your racial group to marry other 
people who are the same race? 
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Appendix B - Prosocial Obligations Measures 
Please rate how much obligation you would feel in the following hypothetical situations; Scale 
from I -10 (1 = no obligation at call; 10 = a very great obligation) 
Civic obligations 
i. To serve on a jury if called. 
ii. To keep fully informed about national news and public issues. 
iii. To testify in court about an accident you witnessed. 
iv. To vote in local and national elections. 
Work obligations 
i. To do more than most people would do on your kind of job. 
ii. To work hard even if you didn "t like or respect your employer or supervisor. 
To cancel plans to visit friends if you were asked, but no t required, to work overtime. 
Welfare obligations 
i. To pay more for your health care so that everyone had access to health care. 
ii. To volunteer time or money to social causes you support. 
iii. To collect contributions for heart or cancer research if asked to do so. 
iv. To vote for a law that would help others worse off than you but would increase your taxes. 
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Appendix C - Factor structure of Prosocial Obligations 
Confirmatory factor analyses were performed on three models using one twin from each 
pair (randomly assigned; n = 1005) to satisfy the assumption of independence: Model 1. A one- 
factor model, with a latent "prosocial obligations" factor loading directly on each of the 
obligations items; Model 2. A model with three un- correlated obligations factors (civic, work, 
and welfare), each loading on their respective items; Model 3. A hierarchical factor model in 
which a super- ordinate "prosocial obligations" factor loaded on the three obligations domains 
(civic, work, and welfare), which in turn loaded on their respective items. 
Both Model 1 and Model 2 fitted the data poorly. By contrast, Model 3 fitted the data 
reasonably well, and minor modifications to Model 3 (the inclusion of two residual co- variances) 
produced a well -fitting model (Model 3a). Path diagrams are shown in Figures Al -A4. Fit 
statistics are detailed in Table Al. 
Table Al Fit statistics for confirmatory factor analyses on prosocial obligations measures. 
X 
Model 1 1052.09 
Model 2 848.94 
Model 3 305.64 
Model 3a 206.90 
df CFI RMSEA 
44 .710 .151 
44 .768 .135 
41 .924 .080 
39 .955 .065 
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Figure Al Path diagram of Model 1: A one -factor model, with a latent `prosocial obligations' 
factor loading directly on each of the obligations items. 
Figure A2 Path diagram of Model 2: A model with three un- correlated obligations factors (civic, 
work, and welfare), each loading on their respective items. 
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Figure A3 Path diagram of Model 3: A hierarchical factor model with a super -ordinate `prosocial 
obligations' factor loading on the three obligations domains (civic, work, and welfare). 
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Figure A4 Path diagram of Model 3a: As in Model 3, with the addition of two residual co- 
variances. 
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